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Abstract
Mobility as a Service (MaaS) has recently received a significant attention from researchers, in-
dustry stakeholders, and the public sector. The vast majority of existing MaaS paradigms are
articulated based on the traditional segmentation of travel modes, e.g. private vehicle, public
transportation (bus, metro, light rail) and shared mobility (car/bike/ride-sharing, ride-sourcing).
In the context of ‘Everything-as-a-Service’ (XaaS), service providers have evolved from product-
based models towards less segmented representations in which resources are priced in a continuous
fashion. Yet, such continuous resource allocation formulations are inexistent for MaaS systems.
This study attempts to address this gap in the literature by introducing innovative MaaS mecha-
nisms that allocate mobility resources to users without any form of travel mode segmentation. We
introduce an online auction framework where travelers have the possibility to bid for continuous
mobility resources based on their requirements and willingness to pay (WTP). We propose two
MaaS mechanisms, named Pay-as-You-Go (PAYG) and Pay-as-a-Package (PAAP), which allow
travelers to either pay for the immediate use of mobility services or to subscribe to mobility ser-
vice packages for a more protracted usage. Both MaaS mechanisms are based on mixed-integer or
linear programming formulations designed to maximize social welfare in the transport system. We
show that the proposed PAYG and PAAP mechanisms are incentive-compatible thus promoting
truthful user bidding behavior. We develop efficient online primal-dual algorithms to implement
the proposed MaaS mechanisms and derive theoretical bounds on the worst-case performance of
these algorithms. Moreover, we design a rolling horizon framework to incorporate booking flexibil-
ity and improve the social welfare obtained by the proposed online algorithms. Numerical results
on extensive problem instances generated from realistic mobility data highlight the benefits of the
proposed MaaS mechanisms, and quantify the trade-offs among the proposed approaches.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the rapid evolution of the digital and sharing economy has brought signifi-
cant changes in how various services are provided. Everything-as-a-Service concept (XaaS) – such
as Computing-as-a-service, Platform-as-a-service, Software-as-a-Service – is revolutionizing tradi-
tional models, where people value experience over the possession of material commodity. The global
economic transition from ‘commodity’ to ‘service’ to ‘experience’ has changed the way how services
are delivered to travelers. In this context, the transport sector is experiencing a vast revolution
brought by the Mobility as a Service (MaaS) concept.
The increasing number of transport services and the advances in information and automated
vehicle technologies pave the way for the development of innovative MaaS paradigms. Yet, the def-
inition of MaaS is is still a topic of discussion within the research community. The Dutch Ministry
defined MaaS as the provision of multimodal, demand-driven mobility services, offering customised
travel options to customers via a digital platform with real-time information, including payment
and transaction processing in the white paper (MuConsult, 2017). Kamargianni et al. (2016)
indicated that the term MaaS should focus on purchasing mobility services based on consumer
needs, rather than purchasing travel across different transport modes. Hensher (2017) indicated
that MaaS will shift the public transport contracts from the current output-based form (deliv-
ering kilometres on defined modes) to outcome-based models (delivering accessibility using any
mode), thereby become mode-agnostic. Hensher and Mulley (2020) summarized that MaaS can be
identified as offering users a multimodal package of mobility with a single payment platform.
Traditionally, a user travelling with different transport modes are required to make payments
to multiple TSPs. In the MaaS paradigm, subscriptions or payments can be made through a single
digital platform under two tariff models: Pay-as-You-Go (PAYG) and Pay-as-a-Package (PAAP).
PAYG charges users according to the effective use of the service; whereas PAAP allows customers
to subscribe a more protracted period usage of mobility packages, such as a weekly or monthly
package through a single payment. Ho et al. (2018) discussed different payment mechanisms in
MaaS and reported that PAAP was not more attractive due to its higher single payment. However,
PAAP allows customers to pre-pay for the mobility services with lower marginal costs (Kamargianni
et al., 2016), has the potential to attract more travelers to the shared modes and public transit
(Matyas and Kamargianni, 2019a) and is beneficial for the sustainability.
We summarize the main characteristics of MaaS reported in the existing literature in Table 1.
Table 1: The characteristics of Mobility as a Service in the existing literature
Features Explanations Literature
Integration of modes Bundle different public and (Mulley et al., 2018; Utriainen and Po¨lla¨nen, 2018)private transportation modes. (Wong et al., 2020; Meurs et al., 2020)
Customized subscription Tailor the service for a traveler (Polydoropoulou et al., 2020; Caiati et al., 2020)based on preference and WTP (Mulley et al., 2018; Matyas and Kamargianni, 2019b)
Digital platform Users can book or request (Kamargianni and Matyas, 2017; Barreto et al., 2018)services on a digital platform. (Merkert et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2016)
On-demand Offer demand-responsive (Jittrapirom et al., 2017; Djavadian and Chow, 2017)services and tariff (Hensher, 2017; Mulley et al., 2018)
Payment options Pay-as-You-Go and (Caiati et al., 2020; Ho et al., 2020)Pay-as-a package (Matyas and Kamargianni, 2019a)
Operation mode Free market operation and (Wong et al., 2020; Hensher et al., 2020)government-contracted operation (Hensher et al., 2020; Hirschhorn et al., 2019)
Multi-actors MaaS ecosystem focuses on (Merkert et al., 2020; Pantelidis et al., 2020)multi-disciplinary collaborations (Polydoropoulou et al., 2020; Beheshtian et al., 2020)
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Although MaaS appears to be attractive, Karlsson et al. (2020) have shown that most travellers
are not willing to change their travel habits and register as a MaaS customer of the UbiGo pilot
in Gothenburg. The authors concluded that whether travelers can perceive a ‘match’ between
their mobility requirements and the solution offered by the service (in terms of cost, transport
modes,etc.) or not, is the decisive factor to remove the barrier. This highlights that further
research is needed to develop and to promote practical MaaS solutions.
We explore the potential of MaaS solutions through the lens of mechanism design, which focuses
on the identification of economic incentives to achieve targeted objectives (Haeringer, 2018). Our
goal is to develop online, incentive-compatible auction-based mechanisms for MaaS that aim to
maximize social welfare. This is motivated by the rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT)
which have made online auctions increasingly popular, notably in the context of Computing-as-a-
Service (CaaS). CaaS allows users to locate applications and data on a third-party server, instead of
investing in its own Information Technology (IT) infrastructures. The advent of cloud computing
resources served by providers such as ‘Google cloud’ could efficiently allocate the multi-resources
to end-users based on different online mechanisms. For instance, Zhang et al. (2013) proposed a
truthful online cloud auction framework for users with heterogeneous requests. Shi et al. (2015)
designed a truthful online combinatorial auction for cloud computing, which is computationally
efficient and can guarantee a certain competitive ratio. Zhou et al. (2016) proposed an efficient
online auction design to allocate the cloud resources by considering the completion deadlines and
developed efficient approximation algorithms. More recently, Tafsiri and Yousefi (2018) proposed
a combinational double auction-based mechanism for cloud computing and proved the efficiency
and incentive compatibility of the mechanism.
Inspired by the literature and practice on CaaS, we propose a MaaS paradigm based on the
premise that mobility services can be regarded as continuous quantities. For instance, distance,
travel time, and price can be regarded as continuous features of a mobility service. Building on this
framework, we propose MaaS online mechanisms to efficiently allocate mobility resources to user
requests so as to maximize social welfare. The main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows (the main tasks in this paper are illustrated in Figure 1):
• We propose an innovative and alternative representation for MaaS in which continuous and
unified mobility resources integrated from both public and private multi-modal transportation
providers can be effectively and efficiently allocated to travelers based on their preference and
willingness to pay (WTP) through a single payment on a digital platform.
• We design incentive-compatible PAYG and PAAP mechanisms based on the online auctions, and
formulate mixed-integer and linear optimization formulations to allocate mobility resources to
user requests so as to maximize social welfare.
• We develop PAYG and PAAP online algorithms for the proposed online formulations and derive
guaranteed optimality bounds (competitive ratio) of the proposed online algorithms.
• We design a rolling horizon framework to consider booking flexibility and improve the solution
quality of the MaaS online mechanisms by executing offline formulations in online fashion.
• We conduct numerical experiments to test the proposed online mechanisms, formulations, algo-
rithms and illustrate their performance on a series of problems. The results also show that the
proposed online algorithms are competitive and can be efficiently executed in large scale data
sets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the problem setting; Sec-
tion 3 introduces MaaS online mechanisms; Section 4 (Section 5) gives PAYG (PAAP) online and
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PAAP offline formulation
PAYG offline formulation
PAYG 
competitive ratio
PAAP 
competitive ratio
Rolling horizon framework
PAYG online algorithm
PAYG online mechanism
PAYG online formulation
PAAP online mechanism
PAAP online algorithm
MaaS online 
mechanisms
MaaS offline
 formulations
PAAP online formulation
Online auction-based
Figure 1: Overview of main tasks in this paper
offline mobility resources allocation formulations, tailors PAYG (PAAP) primal-dual online algo-
rithm, derives the competitive ratio of PAYG (PAAP) online algorithm and proves the incentive
compatibility of the PAYG (PAAP) online mechanism. Section 6 designs a rolling horizon-based
framework; Section 7 conducts numerical experiments for illustration; Section 8 concludes the
paper, provides the remarks and discusses future research directions.
2. Problem Setting
2.1. Problem statement
In the proposed MaaS paradigm, assume that a traveler can request multiple mobility services
in terms of different travel time (speed) for the given travelling distance, then the mobility resources
integrated from different transportation service providers (TSPs) can be allocated to travelers in
forms of a ‘bundle plan’, which combines different transport modes (e.g. taxi, ride-sharing, public
transit, bicycle-sharing) in the most logic and efficient way. For each mode, the average speed and
inconvenience degrees per time slot based on vehicle occupancy and transfers are assumed known
(see examples in Figure 2); thus the average speed and inconvenience degree of a MaaS bundle can
be determined based on the time spent in each mode. In analogy to a commodity-based transport
paradigm, the quantity of a mobility service is described by the distance of a trip, and the quality
is described by the speed, delay, and inconvenience degrees, etc.
In the PAYG mechanism, a traveler is assumed to bid for a mobility service for immediate use,
and the traveler’s request should be either accepted or rejected, i.e. we represent this decision
as binary allocation. In turn, under the PAAP mechanism, a traveler is assumed to subscribe
a mobility package to be used over a pre-defined period of time, e.g. such as a monthly mobile
phone subscription. In this context, travelers are assumed to bid for mobility package but may
be allocated any fractional amount of their requested mobility services. The fraction of a bundle
plan denotes the proportion of the requested distance and travel time, keeping the requested speed
unchanged.
We depict two examples in Figure 2. Consider a traveller with the fixed inconvenience tolerance
of 100 for each trip will purchase a 10 km-mobility service for immediate usage or subscribe a 70
km-mobility service for weekly usage. In the PAYG mechanism, the traveler can request for a ‘10
km-service’ by bidding for different speeds at different prices. For example, if the traveller submits
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Pay-as-You-Go
• Distance:10 km
• Speed: 12.2  km/h  
• Inconvenience degrees: 83
• [10min Ridesharing + 39min  Bus]
• $10/trip
Pay-as-a-Package
• Distance: 70 km
• Speed: 12.2 km/h  
• Inconvenience degrees : 290
• [70min Ridesharing use +
• 273min Bus use]
• $70/week
• Distance:10 km
• Speed: 30 km/h  
• Inconvenience degrees : 0
• [20min Taxi]
• $35/trip
• Distance:10 km
• Speed: 15.9 km/h  
• Inconvenience degrees : 56
• [10min Taxi + 28min Metro]
• $20/trip
⋯
Bundle plan D
Transportation modes Taxi Ridesharing with 2 riders Ridesharing with 3 riders Public transit Bicycle-sharing
Speed (km/min) 0.5 0.3 0.25 0.18 0.1
Inconvenience degree/min 0 0.5 1 2 6
Taxi Ridesharing Bus Metro Bicycle-sharing
Bundle plan A Bundle plan B Bundle plan C
Package bundle plan A
• Distance: 70 km
• Speed: 30 km/h  
• Inconvenience degrees : 0
• [40min Taxi use]
• $245/week
Package bundle plan B
• Distance: 70 km
• Speed: 15.9 km/h  
• Inconvenience degrees : 78
• [70min Taxi use +
196min Metro use]
• $140/week
Package bundle plan C Weekly package plan 
• Distance: 70 km
• Speed: 18.28 km/h
• [26min Taxi use +
39min Metro use
• 35min Ridesharing use
• + 136min  Bus use]
• Inconvenience degrees :369
• $136/weekFortnight  plan,   Monthly plan, ⋯
50% 30% 20%

Bundle plan E

Figure 2: Examples of the bundle plans in Pay-as-You-Go and Pay-as-a-Package mechanisms
three bids such as (10km, 12.2km/h, $10), (10km, 30km/h, $50) and (10km, 30km/h, $20); then
MaaS operator will arrange the most efficient combinations of transport modes for each bid from
a practical standpoint of this trip, such as three bundle plans shown in Figure 2. Although any of
the three bundle plans is feasible for the traveler, PAYG online mechanism allocates the traveler
with the bundle plan that can maximize his/her utility, e.g. ‘Bundle plan C’.
In the PAAP mechanism, the traveller’s inconvenience tolerance is 700 for a weekly package
plan, assume that the traveller submits three bids such as (70km, 12.2km/h), (70km, 30km/h, $350)
and (70km, 30km/h), if MaaS operator arranges package bundle plan A, B and C for the traveler
with a fraction such as 50%, 30% and 20%, then the weekly package plan can be denoted by
(70km, 18.23km/h), which is the weighted sum of the corresponding distance, speed and inconve-
nience degrees in three package bundle plans (see in Figure 2). Note that the inconvenience degrees
of any bundle plan can not exceed the traveler’s fixed inconvenience tolerance.
2.2. Preliminaries
We consider the problem of managing the allocation of mobility resources from the perspec-
tive of the MaaS operator with the aim to maximize social welfare in the transport system. In
the proposed MaaS paradigm, users are assumed to be able to bid for mobility bundles to meet
their travel needs. Hence, from the MaaS operator’s perspective, the decision problem at hand is
to optimize the allocation of mobility resources while accounting for users’ (multi-)bids for MaaS
bundles so as to maximize social welfare. To enable this MaaS paradigm to address the proposed
optimization problem, we make the following assumptions on the context of the transport system.
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Travelers TSPsMaaS 
operator
Government
Taxi companies
Ridesharing Companies
Metro operators
Bus companies
Bicycle sharing companies
Figure 3: Mobility as a Service under government contracting
A summary of the mathematical notations used throughout the paper is provided in Appendix A.
Assumption 1: Autonomous transport system. We consider autonomous vehicles and au-
tonomous public transportation system providing on-demand public transit without fixed schedules
and stops. Therefore, travel is assumed to be flexible with respect to time and space.
Assumption 2: MaaS market under government contracting. Wong et al. (2020) envis-
aged a government-contracted MaaS model that delivers on autonomous market freedoms while
maintaining strong regulatory control, where the government can directly cooperate with a MaaS
operator through a competitive tender. Similarly, this study considers the MaaS operator un-
der government contracting who integrates mobility resources from various TSPs, such as taxi
companies, ridesharing companies, metro operators, bus companies and bicycle-sharing companies
(Figure 3). The aim of MaaS operator under government contracting is to optimize social welfare.
Further, we assume that the MaaS operator and the TSPs are under reselling contracts, in which
TSPs are paid by the MaaS operator to satisfy their reservation utility regardless of whether the
provided mobility resources are utilized.1
Assumption 3: MaaS system with given capacity and without congestion. We assume
that the quantity of available mobility resources in the transport system is known and that the
network is congestion-free. The summation of the number of vehicles times their speed represents
the total distance traveled within one time slot, which is the movement capacity of the network
itself used to derive the quantity of available mobility resources. Let M be the set of transport
modes considered. To capture the difference among various transport modes, the distance corre-
sponding to the TSP m is weighted by the average speed of mode-m vehicle denoted by vm. We
assume that the number of mode-m vehicles Nm, the number of seats on a mode-m vehicle hm,
and the average speed of mode-m vehicle vm are fixed. Hence, the quantity of capacity-weighed
mobility resources available at each time slot is denoted by C (see in Eq.(1)):
C =
∑
m∈M
vm ·Nmvmhm, (1)
where Nmvmhm represents the total distance provided by TSP m per time slot.
1The reselling model has already been discussed by many in the literature for shared mobility, e.g., Zhang et al.
(2020). One may refer to the literature for more detailed discussion regarding the reselling model.
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Assumption 4: The average speed of different modes is not the “driving speed” but
takes into potential service delays (e.g., commercial speed). In the proposed MaaS
paradigm, we assume that the waiting time, pick-up time, drop-off time, transfer time, detour
time, etc. are already incorporated into the average speed of each mode; thus the average speed
is the commercial speed rather than the driving speed on the road. Different transport modes
with varying vehicle occupancy are assumed to have different commercial speed, i.e., v4 (public
transit)<v3(ridesharing with 3 riders)< v2(ridesharing with 2 riders)<v1(taxi).
We next introduce MaaS online mechanisms to solve mobility resource allocation problems
under the proposed MaaS paradigm.
3. MaaS online mechanisms
The proposed MaaS online mechanisms (PAYG and PAAP) are designed to efficiently match
travellers’ requirements and WTP with the available mobility resources through an online auction
process, where a bid is an expression of the traveller’ requirements and WTP, and the auction
outcomes include the allocated weighted quantity of mobility resources and payment. We next
present the online auction setting in Section 3.1, before introducing the auction process in Section
3.2. We then introduce time-varying payment rules in Section 3.3 and illustrate the proposed online
auction in an example in Section 3.4.
3.1. Online auction setting
We propose a sealed-bid online auction, where a bidder submits multiple atomic bids to the
auctioneer without knowing other bidders’ information. A bidding language (Nisan, 2006) defines
the way that bidders are allowed to express their requirement and formulate their bids. In the
PAYG mechanism, travelers use exclusive-OR (XOR) bidding language, which allows each traveler
at most wins one of the submitted multiple bids. In the PAAP mechanism, travelers use additive-
OR (OR) bidding language, which allows each bidder either gets all items contained in a bundle
through the weighted sum of multiple bids or gets nothing. The participators of the online auction
include:
• Owner: transportation service providers (TSPs) such as taxi companies, ridesharing companies,
bus companies, metro operators and bicycle-sharing companies.
• Customer: A traveler can buy any quantity of mobility service with the required quality ac-
cording to his or her preference and WTP.
• Auctioneer: MaaS operator is a third party to monitor and manage the auction process involv-
ing the TSPs and the travelers according to the auction rules.
The proposed online auction consists of three rules: i) winner determination rule, ii) payment
rule and iii) mobility resources allocation rule. The MaaS operator first determines the number of
travelers who can participate in the following auction process, and then determine the successful
bidders based on the winner determination rule; finally allocates mobility resources to the successful
bidders in terms of bundle plan and charges the travelers based on the payment rule. The above
rules are assumed to be known to all the participants in the online auction process.
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Figure 4: Critical index selection and winner determination in the online auction
3.2. Online auction process
The proposed MaaS online mechanisms are executed at each time slot, and the main procedure
of the auction process at time slot t is introduced in the following steps.
Step 1: Submit the bidding language. For each time slot t, we consider a set of travellers I(t)
who submit their multi-bids to the MaaS operator with either PAYG or PAAP option.
In the PAYG mechanism, each bid submitted by Traveler i includes his or her origin and
destination information (ζi) which is converted into the shortest travelling distance (Di) by
MaaS operator,departure time (Oi), delay budget (Φi), inconvenience tolerances (Γi). Fur-
ther, let Ji be the set of Traveler i’s atomic bids, for Traveler i’s bid j: requested travel time
(Tij) and bidding price (bij) are provided, and the weighted quantity of mobility resources
for Traveler i’s bid j is defined as Qij = Di DiTij . Overall Traveler i’s XOR bidding language
is denoted by Bi = {Di, Oi,Φi,Γi, {Tij , bij : j ∈ Ji}} or Bi = {Oi,Φi,Γi, {Qij , bij : j ∈ Ji}}.
In the PAAP mechanism, a traveler directly requests for the distance (Di) included in the mo-
bility package, Oi represents Traveler i’s requested start date of the mobility package, Traveler
i’s requested time period of the package (Li) is also provided. Then the OR bidding language
is written asBi = {Di, Oi,Φi,Γi, Li, {Tij , bij : j ∈ Ji}} orBi = {Oi,Φi,Γi, Li, {Qij , bij : j ∈ Ji}}.
Step 2: Select the bidders. Let Traveler i’s unit bidding price for bid j ∈ Ji be the ratio
of the bidding price bij to the weighted quantity of mobility resources Qij . Let j∗i be the
bid corresponding to the maximum unit bidding price of user i ∈ I(t), defined as j∗i =
arg maxj∈Ji
{
bij
Qij
}
,∀i ∈ I(t). Let At be the available mobility resources at time slot t. If
the mobility resources of the MaaS system are deficient, the MaaS operator sorts travelers
by decreasing maximum unit bidding price, and determines the participants of the auction
by identifying the critical index k such that ∑k−1i=1 Qij∗i ≤ At < ∑ki=1Qij∗i . Travelers k, k +
1, . . . , |I(t)| are removed from the current auction, and the set I(t) is updated to I(t) =
{1, 2, . . . , k − 1} (see in Figure 4).
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Step 3: Winner determination. Let pt be the unit price determined by the MaaS operator
at time slot t based on the current available mobility resources At, which will be discussed
later in Section 3.3. If all of Traveller i’s unit bidding prices are smaller than the unit price
at time slot t, namely, if bijQij ≤ pt,∀j ∈ Ji, then all of Traveler i’s bids will be rejected;
otherwise, one of Traveller i bids will be accepted. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where
Travelers 1, 2, · · · , k − 2 succeed in the auction at time slot t, and Travelers k − 1, · · · , |I(t)|
are rejected at time slot t. The rejected travellers can participate in subsequent auctions at
the following time slots with the same bidding price or submit new bids.
Step 4: Resources allocation and payments. In the PAYG mechanism, a successful bidder
can get a bundle plan corresponding to the bid that can maximize his or her utility. In the
PAAP mechanism, a successful bidder can get a package bundle plan based on the allocated
fraction of each bid. Then the payment is charged according to the time-varying payment
rules (see in Section 3.3). Traveler i’s utility obtained from bid j is defined as Eq.(2):
uij = vij − pij , (2)
where vij denotes Traveler i’s valuation (WTP) on bid j, vij = bij holds in an incentive-
compatible mechanism, pij denotes Traveler i’s payment for bid j defined in Eq.(3).
Step 5: Update the occupied mobility resources. After each auction, MaaS operator sums
the arranged number of time slots during a trip for each accepted Traveler i (Li) and then
update each traveler i’s quantity of occupied mobility resources within the range of his/her
departure time slot (Oi) to arrival time slot (Oi + Li), respectively.
3.3. Time-varying payment rules
The proposed time-varying pricing scheme aims to guarantee that when the mobility resources
are deficient, the travellers who are willing to pay higher can secure the service, and is significantly
different between peak and non-peak hours. This pricing scheme can be regarded as the posted
pricing, in which the unit price (pt) is posted at each time slot, and then the payment is determined
by a traveler’s requested weighted quantity of mobility resources.
Traveler i’s payment for bid j is calculated through Eq.(3):
pij = pt
∑
j∈Ji
Qijxij ,∀i ∈ I(t), (3)
where xij is a binary variable indicating the acceptance or rejection in the PAYG mechanism and
is a continuous variable within [0,1] indicating the allocated fraction in the PAAP mechanism. Qij
is the weighted quantity of mobility resources for Traveler i’s bid j, pt is the unit price at time slot
t.
At time slot t, the range of unit price is within the minimum and maximum unit bidding price,
pt ∈ [bmin, bmin + bmax], in which bmin = mini∈I(t),j∈Ji
{
bij
Qij
}
, bmax = maxi∈I(t),j∈Ji
{
bij
Qij
}
. We
consider three types of unit price functions: linear, quadratic and exponential. Recall that C is
the mobility resources capacity, let zt = C−At denote the quantity of allocated mobility resources
at time slot t. The proposed unit price functions are discussed below.
• The linear unit price function is:
pt =
bmax
C
zt + bmin. (4)
Note that if zt = 0, pt = bmin; if zt = C, pt = bmax + bmin.
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• The quadratic unit price function is:
pt =
1
C2
(zt)2 +
bmax
C
zt + bmin. (5)
Since dptdzt ≥ 0, Eq.(5) monotonically increases with respect to zt within [bmin, bmin + bmax].
• The exponential unit price function in the PAYG mechanism is:
pt =
bmax
αt − 1 ·
(
α
zt
C
t − 1
)
+ bmin, (6)
where αt = (1 + Rt)
1
Rt , Rt = maxi∈I(t)
{
Qi
At
}
, Qi = maxj∈Ji {Qij} , ∀i ∈ I(t). The unit price in
Eq.(6) monotonically increases with respect to zt within [bmin, bmin + bmax].
Similarly, the exponential unit price function in the PAAP mechanism is:
pt =
bmax
βt − 1 ·
(
β
zt
C
t − 1
)
+ bmin, (7)
where βt = (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt , ϕt = mini∈I(t)
{Qi
At
}
, Qi = minj∈Ji {Qij} , ∀i ∈ I(t). Note that exponen-
tial unit price function will be used to design the iteration rule in Algorithm 1 (Line 16) and
Algorithm 2 (Line 17).
3.4. Illustration of the proposed online auction mechanism
We next give an example to illustrate the online auction process in the PAYG mechanism
shown in Figure 5. We assume that the capacity is C = 10 and we use a linear unit price function
pt = 0.2(C −At) + 1. At denotes the weighted quantity of available resources at time slot t.
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
4 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1                2             3             4               5              6                7              8           9             10       
Time slot 1:
Time slot 2:
Time slot 3:
𝒑𝟏=$1
𝒑𝟐=$2.2
𝒑𝟑=$2.8
𝑄1=6, 𝐿1
′ = 3
𝑄2=3, 𝐿2
′ = 9
𝑨𝒕
𝑨𝒕
𝑨𝒕
Traveler 1
Traveler 2
⋮
Time slot 
2             3             4               5              6                7              8               9             10  Time slot 
3             4               5              6                7              8               9             10       Time slot 
Figure 5: An example to illustrate the online auction process
I At time slot 1:
Step 1: Both Traveler 1 and Traveler 1′ submit two bids to the MaaS operator:
B1 = {(O1 = 1,Φ1 = 1,Γ1 = 20, {Q11 = 7, b11 = $7.7), (Q12 = 6, b12 = $7.2)}}
B1′ = {O1′ = 1,Φ1′ = 5,Γ1′ = 30, {(Q1′1 = 7, b1′1 = $6.3), (Q1′2 = 6, b1′2 = $3)}}
Step 2: The MaaS operator sorts the unit bidding price b12Q12 ≥ ba1Qa1 , since Q12 ≤ C ≤ Q12 +Q1′1,
only Traveler 1 can participate in the following online auction.
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Step 3: Assume that all mobility resources are available at time slot 1, i.e. A1 = C, the unit
price is p1 = $1. Since p1 ≤ b11Q11 and p1 ≤ b12Q12 , Traveler 1’s both bids may be accepted. To
determine which bid to accept, the MaaS operator calculates Traveler 1’s utility for the two
bids via Eq.(2): u11 = b11−p1Q11 = $7.7−$7 = $0.7, u12 = b12−p1Q12 = $7.2−$6 = $1.2.
Step 4: Since u11 < u12, the MaaS operator arranges a bundle plan for bid 2 and charges Traveler
1 the payment p12 = p1Q12 = $6.
Step 5: Since Traveler 1’s total travel time (L1) is 3 time slots, the MaaS operator will update the
quantity of occupied mobility resources within time slot 1 ∼ time slot 3 (Figure 5).
IAt time slot 2:
Step 1: Traveler 2 submits 2 bids to the MaaS operator.
B2 = {O2 = 2,Φ2 = 5,Γ2 = 35, {(Q21 = 3, b21 = $8), (Q22 = 6, b22 = $13)}}
Step 2: Q21 ≤ A2, thus Traveler 2 can participate in the following online auction.
Step 3: The MaaS operator posts the unit price (p2 = 0.2×6+1 = $2.2). Since p2 ≤ b21Q21 , p2 > b22Q22
Traveler 2’s bid 1 will be accepted.
Step 4: The MaaS operator will arrange a bundle plan for Traveler 2’s bid 1 and charge Traveler
2 the payment p21 = p2Q21 = $6.6.
Step 5: Since Traveler 2’s total travel time (L′2) is 9 time slots, the MaaS operator will update the
quantity of occupied mobility resources within time slot 2 ∼ time slot 10 (Figure 5).
IAt time slot 3:
Step 1: Traveler 3 submits 2 bids to the MaaS operator.
B3 = {{O3 = 3,Φ3 = 6,Γ3 = 25, (Q31 = 1, b31 = $2), (Q32 = 0.5, b32 = $1.2)} , }
Step 2: Q31 = A3, thus Traveler 3 can participate in the online auction.
Step 3: The MaaS operator posts the unit price (p2 = 0.2 × 9 + 1 = $2.8). Since p3 ≥ b31Q31 ,
p3 ≥ b32Q32 , Traveler 3 will be rejected and rolled over into the auction at time slot 4.
The main differences between the PAAP and PAYG mechanisms are in Step 2 and Step 5. In
the PAAP mechanism, travellers can be allocated with a fraction of their requested bids. E.g., if
Traveler 1’s two bids are allocated x11 = 0.3 and x12 = 0.4, the total quantity of mobility resources
allocated for Traveler 1 is x11Q11+x12Q12 = 4.5, and Traveler 1’s payment is x11Q11p1+x12Q12p1 =
$4.5. Then MaaS operator will arrange Traveler 1 with a mobility package for one-week usage
(L1 = 7).
4. Pay-as-You-Go (PAYG) mechanism
We introduce the mobility resources allocation formulation for the PAYG mechanism in Section
4.1, the PAYG primal-dual online algorithm in Section 4.2 and the competitive ratio analysis in
Section 4.3.
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4.1. PAYG online social welfare optimization model
In PAYG mechanism, each time slot t represents a small time interval within one day. Each
traveler could transfer to another mode at the end of any time slot, e.g., a traveler served by a taxi
in time slot t can transfer to be served by a bus in time slot t+ 1. In order to accurately describe
travelers’ transfer among different modes and update the occupied and released mobility resources
timely, t should be set as a small-time interval, such as one minute. For a given time slot t ∈ Ω,
we formulate the online social welfare maximization problem for the PAYG mechanism (Model 1),
as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP).
Model 1 (PAYG online mobility resources allocation formulation).
max
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
j∈Ji
bijxij , (8a)
subject to∑
m∈M
∑
j∈Ji
vml
m
ij =
∑
j∈Ji
Dixij , ∀i ∈ I(t), (8b)
0 ≤
∑
m∈M
lmij − Tijxij ≤ Φi, ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, (8c)∑
m∈M
σml
m
ij ≤ Γi, ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, (8d)
xij (bij − pij) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, (8e)∑
i∈I(t)
∑
j∈Ji
Qijxij ≤ At, (8f)
∑
j∈Ji
xij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I(t), (8g)
0 ≤ lmij ≤ l¯mij , ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji,m ∈M, (8h)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji. (8i)
The main decision variables of Model 1 are lmij a real variable denoting the travel time served
by mode m in the bundle plan arranged for Traveler i’s bid j and xij a binary variable indi-
cating whether Traveler i’s bid j is accepted or not. The social welfare in this paper is de-
fined as the total utility of all travelers and TSPs. TSPs’ utility is the revenue obtained from
travelers, ∑i∈I(t)∑j∈Ji pijxij ; travelers’ utility is the difference between their valuation and the
actual payment, ∑i∈I(t)∑j∈Ji(bij − pij)xij ; thus the objective function (8a) can be written as∑
i∈I(t)
∑
j∈Ji(bij − pij)xij +
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
j∈Ji pijxij . Constraint (8b) guarantees that the bundle plan
arranged for Traveler i’s bid j can satisfy the travelling distance requirement, constraint (8c) guar-
antees that the bundle plan arranged for Traveler i’s bid j can satisfy Traveler i’s travel time
and delay budget requirement, constraint (8d) guarantees that inconvenience degrees of a bundle
plan brought by sharing space with others during the trip should not exceed Traveler i’s incon-
venience tolerance (Γi). Constraint (8e) and constraint (8g) indicates that if a traveler’s bidding
price for each bid is less than the actual payment, it will be rejected; otherwise, one of Traveler
i’s bids will be accepted. Constraint (8f) restricts that the weighted quantity of requested mo-
bility resources should not exceed the weighted quantity of available resources (At) at time slot
t, in which At is obtained by updating each traveler’s quantity of occupied mobility resources
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within his/her departure time slot (Oi) and arriving time slot (Oi + Li) at the end of time slot
t: At+1 = At −∑i∈I(t)∑j∈Ji Qijxij . Constraint (8g) guarantees that at most one bid among a
traveler’s multi-bids will be accepted.
Using Model 1, the proposed PAYG online mechanism determines whether to accept a traveler’s
bid or not, and arranges a bundle plan for accepted bids. We next show that the proposed PAYG
online mechanism is Incentive-Compatible (IC).
Lemma 1. Let Si be the compact set of Traveler i’s bundle plans defined as Si , ⋃j∈Ji Sij ,∀i ∈
I(t),
Sij ,
{
(xij , lij), lij = [lmij ] |(8b)− (8d), bij ≥ pij
}
. (9)
Let χi,s be a binary variable indicating whether the bundle plan s ∈ Si is allocated to Traveler i or
not. The compact integer program (IP) defined in Eq.(10) is equivalent to Model 1.
max
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
bi,sχi,s, (10a)
subject to∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qi,sχi,s ≤ At, (10b)
∑
s∈Si
χi,s ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I(t), (10c)
χi,s ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si. (10d)
Proof. We now show that MILP (8) can be reformulated as IP (10) using a compact packaging
reformulation. According to the winner determination rule of the MaaS online mechanism (Step 4)
and constraint (8e) in Model 1, if bij ≥ pij , Traveler i’s bid j will be accepted, xij = 1; if bij ≤ pij ,
Traveler i’s bid j will be rejected, xij = 0. Let bi,s and Qi,s denote Traveler i’s bidding price and
requested weighted quantity of mobility resources of the bundle plan s arranged for Traveler i’s
bid j, we have Qi,s = Qij ,∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, s ∈ Sij . Moreover, since the arranged bundle plan s
meets all of the requirements on Traveler i’s bid j, Traveler i’s bidding price for bid j is equal to
that for bundle plan s, bi,s = bij , ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, s ∈ Sij . Thus Model 1 can be reformulated as a
compact IP (10) with packaging structure given in Lemma 1.
Theorem 1. The proposed PAYG online mechanism for MaaS is incentive-compatible (IC), in
which bidding truthfully is a traveler’s weakly dominant strategy.
Proof. According to the payment rules of the MaaS online mechanism given in Eq.(3), Traveler
i’s payment for bid j is independent of Traveler i’s bidding price, and will be charged with the
same payment, no matter how much the bidding price is. Traveler i’s utility for bid j is defined in
Eq.(2). If Traveler i bids truthfully, his/her bidding price on bid j is equal to his/her true valuation
(WTP) on bid j, bij = vij ; if bid j is accepted, xij = 1, his/her utility is uij = vij − pij ; if bid j
is rejected, xij = 0, his/her utility is uij = 0. If Traveler i lies about his bidding price, bˆij 6= vij ;
if bid j is accepted, Traveler i’s utility is still uˆij = vij − pij ; if bid j is rejected, his/her utility is
not greater than 0. We enumerate all possible cases to compare Traveler i’s utility for bid j with
regards to truthful and non-truthful bidding behavior in Table 2.
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Table 2: Utility comparison under truthful and non-truthful bidding
No. Cases Non-truthful bidding Truthful bidding Utility comparison
xˆij uˆij xij uij
1 vij < pij < bˆij 1 vij − pij 0 0 uˆij < uij
2 vij < bˆij < pij 0 0 0 0 uˆij = uij
3 pij < vij < bˆij 1 vij − pij 1 vij − pij uˆij = uij
4 bˆij < vij < pij 0 0 0 0 uˆij = uij
5 bˆij < pij < vij 0 0 1 vij − pij uˆij < uij
6 pij < bˆij < vij 1 vij − pij 1 vij − pij uˆij = uij
Table 2 shows that Traveler i’s utility for bid j when bidding truthfully is not less than his utility
when bidding non-truthfully, i.e. uij ≥ uˆij holds under the proposed MaaS online mechanism. Since
bidding truthfully is a traveler’s weakly dominant strategy, the proposed mechanism is IC.
4.2. Primal-dual online algorithm for PAYG mechanism
In this section, we tailor an online algorithm for the proposed MaaS online mechanism by
resorting to the primal-dual algorithm design technique (Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005; Buchbinder
and Naor, 2009).
The online compact IP (10) given in Lemma 1 can be converted into a compact LP by relaxing
the binary variable χi,s ∈ {0, 1} to the continuous variable χi,s ≥ 0. The relaxed compact LP
(OPT1(t)) and its dual problem (OPT2(t)) are summarized as follows:
Primal online OPT1(t) Dual online OPT2(t)
Maximize: max∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si bi,sχi,s, Minimize : Atq(t) +∑i∈I(t) ui,
Subject to: Subject to:∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si Qi,sχi,s ≤ At, Qi,sq(t) + ui ≥ bi,s, ∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si,∑
s∈Si χi,s ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I(t), q(t) ≥ 0,
χi,s ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si, ui ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I(t),
where the primal variable χi,s corresponds to the dual constraint; and where q(t) and ui are the
dual variables corresponding to the two constraints of the primal problem (OPT1(t)) at time slot t.
Observe that q(t) and ui can be interpreted as the unit price at time slot t and Traveler i’s utility.
In Algorithm 1, ω = |Ω| denotes the last time slot, Line 1 initializes the weighted quantity of
available resources at each time slot to capacity C, Line 3 ∼ Line 7 are based on the online auction
process. Line 8 and Line 9 define the parameters Rt and αt. Line 12 ∼ Line 20 show the iterations
of primal variables, dual variables in a time loop. The iteration rule of ui (Line 15) is determined
by the dual constraint, the iteration rule of q(t) (Line 16) is determined by the exponential unit
price function in Eq.(6), Line 16 and Line 17 guarantee that each traveler is allocated with the
bundle plan s∗ that can maximize his utility. Line 21 and Line 22 update each traveler’s quantity
of occupied mobility resources within time slot Oi ∼ Oi + Li at the end of time slot t, and then
provide the quantity of available mobility resources at time slot t+ 1 in Line 10.
Lemma 2. Let S denotes the largest compact set of bundles across all travelers i ∈ I(t). The
worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(|Ω||S||I(t)|).
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Algorithm 1: PAYG primal-dual online algorithm
1 initialize A[1, 2, · · · , ω]← C
2 for t ∈ Ω do
3 each traveler submits a travel request Bi = {Oi,Φi,Γi, {Qi,s, bi,s : s ∈ Si}}
4 Qi ← maxs∈Si {Qi,s} ,∀i ∈ I(t)
5 s∗i ← arg maxs∈Si
{
bi,s
Qi,s
}
,∀i ∈ I(t)
6 sort the unit bidding price in non-decreasing order:
b1,s∗1
Q1,s∗1
≥ b2,s∗2Q2,s ≥ . . . ≥
bk,s∗
k
Qi,s∗
≥ . . . bI,s∗QI,s∗
7 select the critical index k satisfying
∑k−1
i=1 Qi ≤ At <
∑k
i=1Qi and define I(t) = [1, 2, · · · , k − 1]
8 Rt ← maxi∈I(t)
{
Qi
At
}
9 αt ← (1 +Rt)
1
Rt
10 At ← A[t]
11 initialize q(t)← 0
12 for i ∈ I(t) do
13 for s ∈ Si do
14 if q(t) ≤ bi,sQi,s then
15 ui ← bi,s −Qiq(t)
16 q(t)← q(t)(1 + QiAt ) +
bi,s
(αt−1)At
17 s∗ ← arg maxs∈Si {bi,s −Qi,sq(t)}
18 χi,s∗ ← 1
19 else if q(t) > bi,sQi,s then
20 χi,s∗ ← 0
21 count the arranged time slots Li ← d
∑
j∈Ji
∑
s∈Sij
∑
m∈M l
m
ijχi,s∗e
22 update A [Oi : Oi + Li − 1]← A [Oi : Oi + Li − 1]−
∑
s∈Si Qi,sχi,s∗
23 return χ and q
Proof. The operations in Lines 3 to 11 have a worst-case time complexity of O(|I(t)|log|I(t)|)
corresponding to the sort operation in Line 6. This is dominated by the for loop starting from
Line 12 which requires O(|I(t)||S|) time.
Lemma 3. In each time iteration of Algorithm 1 (Line 2), ∆P(i, s) = (1− 1αt )∆D(i, s) holds, in
which ∆D(i, s) and ∆P(i, s) denote the change value in the objective functions of dual problem and
primal problem, respectively.
Proof. In each iteration of a time loop, ∆D(i, s) can be written as Eq.(11), in which ui and ∆q(t)
are obtained from Line 15 and Line 16 in Algorithm 1.
∆D(i, s) = At∆q(t) + ui = At
[
q(t)Qi
At
+ bi,s(αt − 1)At
]
+ ui,
= Qiq(t) +
bi,s
αt − 1 + bi,s −Qiq(t),
= bi,s
( 1
αt − 1 + 1
)
.
(11)
Since χi,s = 1 (Line 18), the change value in objective function of primal problem is ∆P(i, s) =
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bi,s, thus the relationship between ∆D(i, s) and ∆P(i, s) is written as Eq.(12).
∆D(i, s) =
( 1
αt − 1 + 1
)
.∆P(i, s). (12)
Lemma 4. Algorithm 1 constructs feasible solutions for both the primal and dual online problems.
Proof. We first prove that Algorithm 1 yields dual feasible solutions. Let q(t) denote the value
of the dual variable at the end of each iteration in a time loop (Line 2). If q(t) ≥ bi,sQi , then the
dual constraint always holds; else if q(t) ≤ bi,sQi , the dual variables will be increased until the dual
constraints are satisfied. Since ui = bi,s−Qiq(t) (Line 15), the subsequent increase of q(t) is always
feasible due to the winner determination rules: if Traveler i’s unit bidding price on bundle plan s is
no less than the unit price at time slot t, i.e q(t) ≤ bi,sQi,s , Traveler i will be allocated with the bundle
plan s∗ maximizing bi,s−Qiq(t); otherwise, if q(t) ≥ bi,sQi,s , Traveler i will be rejected (xi,s = 0), and
the dual variables will not be updated.
We next show that Algorithm 1 yields primal feasible solutions. The iteration rule of q(t)
(Line 16) ensures that q(t) is bounded by the sum of a geometric sequence with the common ratio
(1+ QiAt ). Consider a geometric sequence produced by the iterations of q(t) for Traveler m: the first
item is bm,s(αt−1)At , in which the value of bm,s is fixed in each iteration (Lines 13∼18), and the common
ratio is 1 + QmAt . Based on the formula of the sum of geometric sequence, we obtain Eq.(13):
q(t) ≥ bm,s
Qm
· 1
αt − 1 ·
[(
1 + Qm
At
)∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
χi,s
− 1
]
, (13)
where the number of iterations in each time loop is larger than ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si χi,s. Eq.(13) can be
rewritten as Eq.(14):
q(t) ≥ bm,s
Qm
· 1
αt − 1 ·
(1 + QmAt
) At
Qm
·
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qmχi,s
At − 1
 . (14)
Let Rt denote the maximum ratio of a traveler’s requested quantity of mobility resources to
the available resources at time slot t, Rt = maxi∈I(t)
{
Qm
At
}
. Since 0 ≤ QiAt ≤
Qm
At
≤ 1, we obtain
Eq.(15):
q(t) ≥ bm,s
Qm
· 1
αt − 1 ·
(1 + QmAt
) At
Qm
·
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At − 1
 . (15)
Since 0 ≤ QiAt ≤ Rt ≤ 1, we have
ln(1+Qi
At
)
Qi
At
≥ ln(1+Rt)Rt , namely, (1 +
Qi
At
)Rt ≥ (1 + Rt)
Qi
At , this
yields Eq.(16):
1 + Qi
At
≥ (1 +Rt)
1
Rt
·Qi
At . (16)
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Since αt = (1 +Rt)
1
Rt and Qi = maxs∈Si {Qi,s}, Eq.(17) can be obtained by substituting
Eq.(16) into Eq.(15):
q(t) ≥ bm,s
Qm
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qi,sχi,s
At
t − 1
 . (17)
According to Eq.(17), if ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qiχi,s ≥ At, then q(t) ≥ bm,sQm . Since Algorithm 1 does
update the primal optimal solution (Line 20) if q(t) ≥ bm,sQm (Line 19), the primal optimal solution
will not be updated any further once ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qiχi,s ≥ At.
4.3. Competitive ratio analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed online primal-dual algorithm (Algorithm 1), we
formulate an offline optimization model for PAYG mechanism which takes as input the entire travel
demand over the multi-time period under consideration summarized in Model 2.
Model 2 (PAYG offline mobility resources allocation formulation).
max
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi
bijx
t
ij , (18a)
subject to∑
m∈M
vml
mt
ij = Dixtij , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18b)
0 ≤
∑
m∈M
lmtij − Tijxtij ≤ Φi, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18c)∑
m∈M
σml
mt
ij ≤ Γi, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18d)
xtij
(
bij − ptij
)
≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18e)
pt =
bmax
C
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
Qijx
t
ij
+ bmin, ∀t ∈ Ω, (18f)
ptij = Qijpt, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18g)∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
Qijx
t
ij ≤ At, ∀t ∈ Ω, (18h)∑
j∈Ji
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi
xtij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, (18i)
0 ≤ lmtij ≤ l¯mtij , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji,m ∈M, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18j)
bmin ≤ pt ≤ bmin + bmax, ∀t ∈ Ω, (18k)
ptij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (18l)
xtij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi. (18m)
Model 2 can be viewed as a time-extended version of Model 1 where variable xtij indicates
whether Traveler i’s bid j will be allocated at time slot t or not, variable lmtij represents the number
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of time slots served by mode m in the bundle plan arranged for Traveler i’s bid j, pt denotes
the unit price at time slot t, and ptij denotes Traveler i’s actual payment for bid j at time slot t.
The objective function (18a) aims to maximize social welfare overall all time slots. Constraints
(18b), (18c) and (18d) guarantee that the bundle plan can satisfy the traveler’s requested distance
requirement, travel time requirement and inconvenience tolerance, respectively. Constraint (18e)
illustrates that when the bidding price is smaller than the actual payment, the bid will be rejected.
Constraint (18f) illustrates that the unit price will grow with the increasing quantity of allocated
mobility resources at different time slots, and vary within [bmin, bmin + bmax]. Constraint (18g)
illustrates that the actual payment at time t is determined by the unit price at time slot t and the
requested weighted quantity of mobility resources. Constraint (18h) restricts the weighted quantity
of requested mobility resources at time slot t can not exceed the weighted quantity of available
mobility resources at time slot t. Constraint (18i) guarantees at most one of Traveler i’s multi-bids
can be accepted at time slot t. Observe that if |Ω|= 1, Model 2 is equivalent to Model 1.
Similar to the online formulation of the PAYG mechanism, Model 2 can be reformulated as a
compact IP which can be relaxed into a compact LP.
Lemma 5. Let Sti be the compact set of Traveler i’s bundle plans defined as Sti ,
⋃
j∈Ji Stij , ∀i ∈
I(t),∀t ∈ Ω, with
Stij ,
{
(xtij , ltij), ltij = [lmtij ] | (18b)− (18g), bij ≥ ptij
}
. (19)
Let χti,s be a binary variable indicating whether bundle plan s ∈ Sti is allocated to Traveler i at time
slot t ∈ Ω or not. The compact IP (20) defined below is equivalent to Model 2.
max
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈Sti
∑
t∈Ω
bi,sχ
t
i,s, (20a)
subject to∑
i∈I
∑
s∈Sti
Qi,sχ
t
i,s ≤ At, ∀t ∈ Ω, (20b)
∑
s∈Sti
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi
χti,s ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, (20c)
χti,s ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, s ∈ Sti . (20d)
Proof. The proof follows from that of Lemma 1.
The compact IP (20) given in Lemma 5 can be converted into a compact LP by relaxing the
binary variable χti,s ∈ {0, 1}, leading to the following primal (OPT3) and dual (OPT4) offline for-
mulations:
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Primal offline OPT3 Dual offline OPT4
Maximize: max∑i∈I∑s∈Sti ∑t∈Ω:t≤Oi bi,sχti,s, Minimize : ∑t∈Ω:t≤Oi Atq(t) +∑i∈I ui,
Subject to: Subject to:∑
i∈I
∑
s∈Sti Qi,sχ
t
i,s ≤ At, ∀t ∈ Ω, Qi,sq(t) + ui ≥ bi,s,∀i ∈ I, s ∈ Sti , t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi,∑
s∈Sti
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi χ
t
i,s ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, q(t) ≥ 0,∀t ∈ Ω,
χti,s ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I, s ∈ Sti , t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi. ui ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I.
Let Z∗(τ ) denote the maximum optimal value of the offline optimization problem (OPT3),
given the input sequence τ . If for any input sequence τ Algorithm 1 outputs a solution which is
at least Θ · Z∗(τ ), then we say that its competitive ratio is Θ (Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005).
Theorem 2. The competitive ratio of Algorithm 1 is Θ = (1− Rmax)
(
1− 1α
)
, where α = mint∈τ αt,
Rmax = maxt∈τ Rt , αt = (1+Rt)
1
Rt , Rt = maxi∈I(t)
{
Qi
At
}
, ∀t ∈ Ω, Qi = maxs∈Si {Qi,s} ,∀i ∈ I(t).
Proof. Let k be the critical index determined at Line 7 of Algorithm 1. Let q(t)end and q(t)start
denote the value of q(t) before and after each iteration in the loop of i = k in Algorithm 1,
respectively. Substituting q(t)end and q(t)start into Line 16 of Algorithm 1, yields Eq.(21):
q(t)end = q(t)start
(
1 + Qk
At
)
+ bk,s(αt − 1)At . (21)
According to Eq.(17) in Lemma 5, before examining Traveler k’s bids, the value of q(t)start is
bounded as:
q(t)start ≥ bk,s
Qk
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At
t − 1
 . (22)
Substituting Eq.(22) into Eq.(21), and simplifying yields:
q(t)end ≥ bi,k
Qk
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At
t − 1
 · (1 + Qk
At
)
+ bk,s(αt − 1) ·At , (23)
≥ bi,k
Qk
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At
t ·
(
1 + Qk
At
)
− 1
 . (24)
According to Eq.(16), we have 1 + QkAt ≥ (1 +Rt)
1
Rt
·Qk
At , thus Eq.(24) can be rewritten as:
q(t)end ≥ bk,s
Qk
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At
t · (1 +Rt)
1
Rt
·Qk
At − 1
 . (25)
Assume that Traveler k is accepted at time slot t, then ∑i∈I(t)\{k}∑s∈Si Qiχi,s + Qkχk,s =
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∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si Qiχi,s, and since αt = (1 +Rt)
1
Rt Eq.(25) can be written as:
q(t)end ≥ bk,s
Qk
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At
t · α
Qk
At
t − 1
 , (26)
= bk,s
Qk
· 1
αt − 1 ·
α
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qiχi,s
At
t − 1
 . (27)
Eq.(27) illustrates that if the requested quantity of mobility resources exceeds the available
mobility resources at time slot t, ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qiχi,s > At, then Traveler k will not be allocated
with any resources qend ≥ bk,sQk , ; thus
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si Qiχi,s ≥ At − maxi∈I(t){Qi}, ∀t ∈ Ω. Since
Rt = maxi∈I(t)
{
Qi
At
}
,∀t ∈ Ω, the social welfare obtained by Algorithm 1 at time slot t is at least:
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
bi,sχi,s ·
At −maxi∈I(t){Qi}
At
=
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
bi,sχi,s · (1−Rt) . (28)
According to Lemma 4, ∆D(i, s) and ∆P(i, s) denote the change value in the objective functions
of dual problem (OPT2(t)) and primal problem (OPT1(t)), respectively, at each iteration of Algo-
rithm 1. Let P(t) and D(t) denote the objective value of the dual and primal problems obtained by
Algorithm 1. At iteration t, we have D(t) = ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si ∆D(i, s), P(t) = ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si ∆P(i, s).
Based on Lemma 3, the relationship between D(t) and P(t) can be described as Eq.(29):
P(t) =
(
1− 1
αt
)
D(t). (29)
Given the input time sequence τ = [1, 2, · · · , t− 1, t], let P(τ ) and D(τ ) denote the objective value
of the primal problem (OPT3) and the dual problem (OPT3) obtained by Algorithm 1. Since
α = mint∈τ αt, Eq.(29) implies:
P(τ ) ≥
(
1− 1
α
)
D(τ ). (30)
Let WAlg1(τ ) denote the social welfare obtained by Algorithm 1 corresponding to the sequence
τ . Since Rmax = maxt∈τ Rt, according to Eq.(28), we have WAlg1(τ ) ≥ (1− Rmax)P(τ ) and:
WAlg1(τ ) ≥ (1− Rmax)
(
1− 1
αt
)
D(τ ). (31)
Given the input sequence τ , Let ZIP (τ ) denote the optimal value of the offline compact IP
(20) and Z∗(τ ) denote the optimal value of the offline compact LP (OPT3). According to weak
duality, we have D(τ ) ≥ Z∗(τ ), and Eq.(31) can be rewritten as follows:
WAlg1(τ ) ≥ (1− Rmax)
(
1− 1
αt
)
Z∗(τ ), (32)
≥ (1− Rmax)
(
1− 1
α
)
ZIP (τ ). (33)
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Hence the competitive ratio of Algorithm 1 is Θ = (1− Rmax)
(
1− 1α
)
.
5. Pay-as-a-Package (PAAP) mechanism
In this section, we present the PAAP mechanism which targets mobility packages that can be
purchased in fractional amounts. We introduce the mobility resources allocation formulation for
the PAAP online mechanism in Section 5.1, the PAAP primal-dual online algorithm in Section 5.2
and the competitive ratio analysis in Section 5.3.
5.1. PAAP online social welfare optimization model
In the proposed PAAP mechanism, time slots are intended to represent longer time periods
compared to the PAYG mechanism, e.g. one day vs one minute. For a given time slot t ∈ Ω,
we formulate the online social welfare maximization problem for the PAAP mechanism as a linear
program (LP) (Model 3).
Model 3 (PAAP online mobility resources allocation formulation).
max
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
j∈Ji
bijxij , (34a)
subject to
(8b)-(8h), (34b)
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji. (34c)
Observe that Model 3 is the LP-relaxation of Model 1 wherein xij is a continuous variable
representing the fraction of mobility resources allocated to Traveler i’s bid j. Analogously to the
PAYG mechanism, we next show that the proposed PAAP online mechanism is IC.
Lemma 6. Let Si be the compact set of Traveler i’s bundle plans defined as Si , ⋃j∈Ji Sij ,∀i ∈
I(t),
Sij ,
{
(rij , lij), lij = [lmij ] |(8b)− (8d), bij ≥ pij
}
(35)
Let ri,s be a continuous variable indicating the fraction of package bundle plan s ∈ Si allocated to
Traveler i. The online compact linear program (LP) defined in Eq.(36) is equivalent to Model 3.
max
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
bi,sri,s, (36a)
subject to∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qi,sri,s ≤ At, (36b)
∑
s∈Si
ri,s ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I(t), (36c)
ri,s ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si. (36d)
Proof. Proof of Lemma 6 is provided in Appendix B.1.
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Theorem 3. The PAAP MaaS online mechanism is IC, in which bidding truthfully is a traveler’s
weakly dominant strategy.
Proof. The dual problem of the compact LP (36) given in Lemma 6 is:
min Atq(t) +
∑
i∈I(t)
ui, (37a)
subject to
Qi,sq(t) + ui ≥ bi,s, ∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si, (37b)
q(t) ≥ 0, (37c)
ui ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I(t). (37d)
where q(t) and ui are the dual variables corresponding to constraints (36b) and (36c), respectively,
and (37b) is the dual constraint corresponding to the primal variable ri,s in the compact LP (36).
According to primal-dual complementary slackness, if ui > 0, constraint (36c) is binding,∑
s∈Si ri,s = 1, ∀i ∈ I(t), namely, Traveler i will be allocated with the requested quantity of
resources; else if ui = 0, then
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si ri,s ≤ 1, namely, Traveler i will be fractionally allocated
with the requested quantity of resources. Moreover, if ri,s > 0, constraint (37b) is binding, ui =∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si bi,s −Qiq(t); if ri,s = 0, ui ≥
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si bi,s −Qiq(t). Hence:
u∗i = max {0, {bi,s −Qi,sq∗(t)}} ,∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si. (38)
where u∗i and q∗(t) denote the optimal solutions of the dual problem (36). If we interpret q(t) as the
unit price at time slot t, then Qi,sq(t) can be interpreted as Traveler i’s payment for package plan
s and ui can be interpreted as Traveler i’s utility obtained from package bundle plan s. According
to Eq.(38), if ui ≥ 0, the proposed PAAP MaaS online mechanism maximizes Traveler i’s utility.
Since we have proved that the maximum utility of each traveler holds at the optimal solution
of the primal problem (36) and dual problem (37), we conduct a sensitivity analysis on Traveler i’s
bidding price (bis) through the simplex tableau method to show IC. Without any loss of generality,
we consider the case in which two travelers i and i+ 1 bid for bundle plan (s) with bidding price
bi,s and bi+1,s. Assume that Traveler i is non-truthful i.e., bids higher or lower than his valuation
on bundle plan s (vi,s). The bid of Traveller i can be written as bˆi,s = bi,s + ∆b, with bi,s = vi,s. In
turn, assume that Traveler i+ 1 bids truthfully, i.e. bi+1,s = vi+1,s. The standardized formulation
of LP (36) can be formulated as LP (39):
max bi,sri,s + bi+1,sri+1,s, (39a)
subject to
Qi,sri,s +Qi+1,sri+1,s + y1 = At, (39b)
ri,s + y2 = 1, (39c)
ri+1,s + y3 = 1, (39d)
ri,s, ri+1,s, y1, y2, y3 ≥ 0. (39e)
where y1, y2 and y3 are the slack variables corresponding to constraints (39b),(39c) and (39d),
respectively. The initial simplex tableau (Table 3.1) obtained from the standard formulation LP
(39) can be converted into the final simplex tableau (Table 3.2) via standard methods.
In Table 4, we conduct sensitivity analysis on bi,s by substituting bi,s in Table 3.2 with bˆi,s =
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Table 3: Simplex tableau before sensitivity analysis on bi,s
Table 3.1: Initial simplex tableau
c bi,s bi+1,s 0 0 0
basic var ri,s ri+1,s y1 y2 y3
y1 Qi,s Qi+1,s 1 0 0
y2 1 0 0 1 0
y3 0 1 0 0 1
z 0 0 0 0 0
σ = c− z bi,s bi+1,s 0 0 0
⇒
Table 3.2: Final simplex tableau
c bi,s bi+1,s 0 0 0
basic var r∗i,s r∗i+1,s y∗1 y∗2 y∗3
r∗i,s 1 0 0 1 0
y∗3 0 0 −1Qi+1,s
−Qi,s
Qi+1,s
1
r∗i+1,s 0 1 1Qi+1,s
Qi,s
Qi+1,s
0
z bi,s bi+1
bi+1,s
Qi+1,s
bi,sQi+1,s+bi+1Qi,s
Qi+1,s
0
σ = c− z 0 0 − bi+1,s
Qi+1,s
− bi,sQi+1,s+bi+1,sQi,s
Qi+1,s
0
Table 4: Simplex tableau after sensitivity analysis on bi,s
⇒
c bi,s + ∆b bi+1 0 0 0
basic variable rˆi,s rˆi+1,s yˆ1 yˆ2 yˆ3
rˆi,s 1 0 0 1 0
yˆ3 0 0 −1Qi+1,s
−Qi,s
Qi+1,s
1
rˆi+1,s 0 1 1Qi+1,s
Qi,s
Qi+1,s
0
z bi,s bi+1,s
bi+1,s
Qi+1,s
(bi,s+∆b)Qi+1,s+bi+1,sQi,s
Qi+1,s
0
σ = c− z 0 0 − bi+1,s
Qi+1,s
− (bi,s+∆b)Qi+1,s+bi+1,sQi,s
Qi+1,s
0
bi,s+∆b. Since the reduced cost of yˆ1 and yˆ2 always hold non-positive values, σ (yˆ1) ≤ 0, σ (yˆ2) ≤ 0,
the optimal solutions do not change with ∆b. Then we investigate how the dual variables uˆi and
qˆ(t) change with ∆b. The reduced cost coefficients (σ) corresponding to the slack variables in the
primal final tableau give the opposite value of dual variables. The value of the ith dual variable
equals to the opposite value of the reduced cost coefficient of the slack variable associated with the
ith primal constraint (Arora, 2004). Since the slack variable yˆ1 in Table 4 corresponds to the dual
variable qˆ(t), we have qˆ(t) = −σ(yˆ1) = bi+1,sQi+1,s . In Table 3.2 we have q∗(t) = −σ(y∗1) =
bi+1,s
Qi+1,s
, the
change value of q(t) is written as Eq.(40) :
∆q(t) = qˆ(t)− q∗(t) = 0. (40)
Since qˆ(t) can be interpreted as the unit price at time slot t, Traveler i’s utility is uˆi = vi,s −
Qi,sqˆ(t), the change in Traveler i’s utility (∆ui) is 0. Moreover, the slack variable y2 corresponding
to the dual variable ui, and thus we have: uˆi = σ(yˆ2) = (bi+∆b)Qi+1,s+bi+1Qi,sQi+1,s , u
∗
i = σ(y∗2) =
biQi+1,s+bi+1Qi,s
Qi+1,s
. Note that Traveler i’s true valuation on package plan s is bi,s, instead of bi,s+ ∆b,
thus Traveler i’s utility is uˆi −∆b, and the change in Traveler i’s utility (∆ui) is written as (41):
∆ui = uˆi −∆b− u∗i = 0. (41)
We have shown that if Traveler i bids higher than his/her true valuation (∆b > 0), his/her
utility remains unchanged, whereas if he/she bids lower than this true valuation (∆b < 0), his/her
utility may remain the same or be reduced. Hence bidding truthfully is a traveler’s weakly dominant
strategy under proposed the PAAP online mechanism.
5.2. PAAP primal-dual online algorithm
We tailor a primal-dual online algorithm for the PAAP mechanism summarized in Algorithm 2.
Although Algorithm 2 has a similar structure to that of Algorithm 1, the definition of parameters
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Qi, ϕt, βt , critical index selection (it is not needed to select in the PAAP mechanism) and iteration
rules of variables ri,s and q(t) are different.
Algorithm 2: PAAP primal-dual online algorithm
1 initialize A[1, 2, · · · , ω]← C
2 for t ∈ Ω do
3 each traveler submits a travel request Bi = {Oi,Φi,Γi, Li, {Qis, bis : s ∈ Si}}
4 Qi ← mins∈Si {Qi,s} ,∀i ∈ I(t)
5 s∗i ← arg maxs∈Si
{
bi,s
Qi,s
}
,∀i ∈ I(t)
6 sort the unit bidding price:
b1,s∗1
Q1,s∗1
≥ b2,s∗2Q2,s∗2 ≥ . . . ≥
bk,s∗
k
Qi,s∗
i
≥ . . . bI,s∗IQI,s∗
I
7 ϕt ← mini∈I(t)
{
Qi
At
}
8 βt ← (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt
9 At ← A[t]
10 initialize q(t)← 0
11 for i ∈ I(t) do
12 for s ∈ Si do
13 if q(t) ≤ bi,sQi,s then
14 ri,s ←
bi,s
∑
s∈Si
Qi,s
Qi,s
∑
s∈Si
bi,s
15 ui ← bi,s −Qiq
16 q(t)← q(t)(1 + QiAt ) +
bi,sri,s
(β−1)At −
(1−ri,s)bi,s
At
17 else if q(t) > bi,sQi,s then
18 ri,s ← 0
19 update A [Oi : Oi + Li − 1]← A [Oi : Oi + Li − 1]−
∑
s∈Si Qi,sri,s
20 return r and q
We next give a series of theoretical results for the PAAP mechanism in Lemmas 7-9 which are
equivalent to those obtained in the PAYG mechanism, however, there are some difference in the
proof procedure. For conciseness, the proofs are given in Appendix B.
Lemma 7. The worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(|Ω||S||I(t)|).
Lemma 8. In each iteration of Algorithm 2, ∆P(i, s) =
(
1− 1β
)
∆D(i, s) holds, in which ∆D(i, s)
and ∆P(i, s) denote the change value in objective function of dual problem and primal problem
after each iteration in a time loop, respectively.
Lemma 9. Algorithm 2 constructs feasible solutions for both the primal and dual online problems.
5.3. Competitive ratio analysis
To analyse the performance of Algorithm 2, we formulate the offline social welfare maximization
optimization problem for the PAAP mechanism as summarized in Model 4:
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Model 4 (PAAP offline mobility resources allocation formulation).
max
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi
bijx
t
ij , (42a)
subject to
(18b)-(18l), (42b)
0 ≤ xtij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji, t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi. (42c)
Model 4 is analogous to Model 2, and if |Ω|= 1, Model 4 is equivalent to Model 3.
Lemma 10. Let Sti be the compact set of Traveler i’s package bundle plans defined as Sti ,⋃
j∈J,t∈Ω Stij ,∀i ∈ I with
Stij ,
{
(xtij , ltij), ltij = [lmtij ] | (18b)− (18g), bij ≥ ptij
}
. (43)
Let ri,s be a continuous variable representing the fraction of package bundle plan s ∈ Sti allocated
to Traveler i. The compact LP defined in Eq.(44) is equivalent to Model 4.
max
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈Sti
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi
bi,sr
t
i,s, (44a)
subject to∑
i∈I
∑
s∈Sti
Qir
t
i,s ≤ At, ∀t ∈ Ω : t ≤ Oi, (44b)
∑
s∈Sti
∑
t∈Ω:t≤Oi
rti,s ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, (44c)
rti,s ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ Sti , t ∈ Ω : t ≤ O. (44d)
Proof. The proof of Lemma 10 is provided in Appendix B.5.
Theorem 4. The competitive ratio (Θ) of Algorithm 2 is 1 − 1β , in which β = mint∈τ βt, βt =
(1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt , ϕt = mini∈I(t)
{Qi
At
}
,∀t ∈ Ω, Qi = mins∈Si {Qi,s} , ∀i ∈ I(t).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix C.
Corollary 1. When the ratio of a traveler’s requested weighted quantity of mobility resources to
the available weighted quantity of mobility resources in a time slot approaches zero, the competitive
ratio of PAYG primal-dual online algorithm (Algorithm 1) is equivalent to the competitive ratio
of the PAAP primal-dual online algorithm (Algorithm 2). Namely, when QiAt → 0, we have Θ =
(1− Rmax)
(
1− 1α
)
=
(
1− 1β
)
= 1− 1e , in which e denotes Euler’s number.
6. Rolling horizon framework
In the proposed MaaS online mechanisms, the travel demand data are input into the model
as a ‘stream’ and the online mechanisms are executed periodically based on the current input
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data, without knowledge of future demand. To implement the proposed MaaS online mechanisms,
we use a rolling horizon algorithm (RHA) where ∆t denotes the time frequency at which the
optimization problems are solved, and T denotes the length of the time horizon considered at the
current iteration. The time horizon length reflects travelers’ booking flexibility: at the iteration at
time t, only travelers with a requested departure time in the time window [t, t+ T ] are considered
in the MaaS online mechanisms.
horizon 1
horizon 2
horizon 3
horizon 4
rolling 1
rolling 2
rolling 3
Δ𝑡
Δ𝑡
Δ𝑡
Δ𝑡
𝑡
Figure 6: Rolling horizon algorithm (RHA) framework
Figure 6 shows that the proposed rolling horizon framework rolls forward per ∆t time slots
and solve the corresponding mobility resource allocation problem within the current time horizon
T . Let ω denote the last time slot, the number of rolling processes (n) is written as ω/∆t. The
detailed procedure of the rolling horizon framework is introduced in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Rolling horizon framework
1 initialize time horizon lengths T and time step ∆t
2 for n ∈ {0,∆t, 2∆t, · · · , ω/∆t} do
3 for i ∈ I(n) do
4 if ∆t = 1 then
5 if MaaS mechanism=PAYG then
6 [χi,s(t), q(t)]←Algorithm 1 (Bi) {execute PAYG online algorithm}
7 pi,s ← pt
∑
s∈Si Qi,sχi,s
8 else if MaaS mechanism=PAAP then
9 [ri,s(t), q(t)]←Algorithm 2 (Bi){execute PAAP online algorithm}
10 pi,s ← pt
∑
s∈Si Qi,sri,s
11 else if ∆t > 1 then
12 if MaaS mechanism=PAYG then
13
[
χti,s, pt, p
t
i,s
]←Model 2 (Bi){execute PAYG offline formulation}
14 else if MaaS mechanism=PAAP then
15
[
rti,s, pt, p
t
i,s
]←Model 4 (Bi){execute PAAP offline formulation}
16 return χ, p and r
We consider four RHA configurations with different time step (∆t), time horizon lengths (T )
and optimization methods. All configurations can be executed with both the PAYG and the PAAP
mechanisms. In each case, the corresponding mobility resources allocation problem can be solved
either exactly (using Model 2/Model 4) or heuristically (using Algorithm 1/Algorithm 2).
1) RHA (∆t = 1, T = 1): rolls forward per time unit slot, and travelers placing an order at time
slot t can request a service departing at time slot t (Oi = t).
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2) RHA (∆t = 1, T = 240): rolls forward per unit time slot, and travelers placing an order at
time slot t can book a service departing within the time window [t, t+ T ].
3) RHA (∆t > 1, T = 240): rolls forward every ∆t time slots to solve a small scale mobility
resources allocation problem, and the travelers placing an order at time t can book a service
departing within the time window [t, t+ T ].
4) SHA (∆t = T , T = 240): this is a single horizon configuration aiming to provide a benchmark
to evaluate alternative configurations. In this configuration, the offline mobility resources allocation
problem is solved with the entire travel demand data for the time period under consideration.
Since the first three configurations run in an online fashion, they are also referred to as online
configurations. Instead, SHA is referred to as the offline configuration and is used as an oracle to
benchmark the performance of the online RHA configurations.
7. Numerical experiments
We conduct a series of numerical experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed MaaS
online mechanisms. Specifically, we discuss the impacts of several parameters, i.e. the number of
bids, the ratio of the maximum unit biding price to the minimum unit bidding price, travel demand
in a time slot, speed change ratio, and capacity. We also examine the impact of different types
of unit price functions on social welfare for both PAYG and PAAP mechanisms, and numerically
quantify the competitive ratios of the proposed online algorithms. All numerical experiments are
conducted using Python 3.7.4 and CPLEX Python API on a Windows 10 machine with, Intel(R)
Core i7-8700 CPU @ 3.20 GHz, 3192 Mhz, 6 Core(s) and with 64 GB of RAM.
7.1. Input data and parameter settings
Travel demand/requests information is an input to the proposed mechanisms. To determine
travelers’ request data, i.e. bidding language sets, we conduct stochastic simulations under different
auction settings, in which the parameters are set as follows. We consider five types of travel
modes with different vehicle occupancy and speed. The average speed (km/min) and inconvenience
(degrees/min) of different modes are given in Table 5.
Table 5: The speed and inconvenience degrees/min of different modes
Modes
m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
Taxi Ride sharing Ride sharing Public transit Bicycle-sharingwith 2 riders with 3 riders
Average speed v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
(km/min) 0.5 0.3 0.25 0.18 0.1
Inconvenience δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5
degrees/min 0 0.5 1 2 6
In the PAYG simulations, Traveller i’s bidding language is {Di, Oi,Φi,Γi, {Tij , bij : j ∈ Ji}}.
Traveler i’s requested distance (Di) for each trip is randomly generated within [1km,18km]. Trav-
eler i’s requested departure time is generated in different ways under different rolling horizon
configurations as discussed in Section 6. Both delay budget (Φi) and inconvenience tolerance (Γi)
are Traveler i’s own characteristic and have a reverse relationship with his/her bidding price, Φi is
randomly generated within
[
0, 100bij
]
, and Γi is randomly generated within
[
0, 100Dibij
]
. To generate
a realistic MaaS system, the requested travel time for each trip should be within the range of
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travel time taken by the fastest mode (taxi) and the slowest mode (bicycle-sharing), namely, the
requested travel time of bid j of user i (Tij) is randomly generated within the range of
[
Di
v5
, Div1
]
.
Given the travelling distance, the bidding price (bij) is set based on the tariff of current trans-
portation system in Sydney including: Uber, metro, bus, Tram and Lime. At each time slot, the
minimum unit bidding price (bmin) is set based on the price of public transit in Sydney2, and the
maximum unit bidding price (bmax) is set based on the price of UberX in Sydney, which varies
over the time during one day3. Accordingly, Traveler i’s bidding price (bij) is randomly generated
within [bminQij , bmaxQij ].
The operation time of the MaaS system is set as 20 hours every day (6:00am-01:00am). We
consider time slot of 1 min, hence there are 1200 time slots per day, and the capacity of mobility
resources in each time slot is set to 500. The number of travellers placing an order at time slot
t (λt) satisfies the normal distribution, where the mean value and standard deviation are set as
different values between peak-hours and non-peak hours as indicated in Table 6.
Table 6: The travel demand of each time slot (λt) in the PAYG simulation
Time 6 : 00− 7 : 00 8 : 00− 9 : 00 10 : 00− 17 : 00 18 : 00− 19 : 00 20 : 00− 01 : 00
Time slot [1, 2 · · · , 120] [121, 122, · · · 240] [241, 182 · · · , 720] [721, 722 · · · , 840] [841, 842, · · · , 1200]
λt λt ∼ N
(
2, 12
)
λt ∼ N
(
8, 22
)
λt ∼ N
(
2, 12
)
λt ∼ N
(
8, 22
)
λt ∼ N
(
2, 12
)
In the PAAP simulations, the bidding language is {Di, Oi,Φi,Γi, Li, {Tij , bij : j ∈ Ji}}. Trav-
eler i’s requested distance (Di) for a mobility package is randomly generated within [1km,300km],
Traveler i’s requested time period of mobility package (Li) is randomly generated within [5,14].
The other parameters are generated in the same way as in the PAYG simulations. In the PAAP
simulations, each time slot represents one day and we consider 100 time slots (days) for a time
cycle, and the capacity of mobility resources at each time slot is set to 10000. The number of
travellers placing an order at time slot t (κt) satisfies the normal distribution, where the mean
value (µ) is 50 and the standard deviation (σ) is 10, κt ∼ N
(
50, 102
)
.
7.2. Numerical Results
We conduct sensitivity analysis on a series of parameters in Section 7.2.1, compare the PAYG
and PAAP mechanisms in Section 7.2.2, validate the derived competitive ratios in Section 7.2.3
and discuss the booking flexibility under different rolling horizon lengths in Section 7.2.4; Finally
compare the social welfare and computation time under different online and offline configurations
in Section 7.2.5.
7.2.1. Sensitivity analysis on the MaaS online mechanisms
In this subsection, we execute Algorithm 1 to evaluate the performance of the PAYG online
mechanism by conducting a sensitivity analysis on the bid range ratio bmax/bmin, unit price func-
tions, the speed change ratio and capacity in terms of acceptance ratio and social welfare.
We define the acceptance ratio as the ratio of the number of accepted travelers to the number of
travelers participating the online auction at time slot t, which is an important index for evaluating
user satisfaction. For clarity, we only show the hourly average acceptance ratio, i.e. the average
2Opal (2020) Trip Planner can be used to estimate the fare of different public transport modes in NSW, Australia.
3 Uber (2020) Real-time Estimator provides real-time fare estimates on each trip.
28
acceptance ratio for each bin of 60 time slots. Figure 7a, Figure 7b and Figure 7c show the
acceptance ratio under linear unit price function (Eq.(4)), quadratic unit price function (Eq.(5))
and exponential unit price function (Eq.(6)) for varying bid range ratios, respectively.
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(c) Exponential unit price function
Figure 7: Acceptance ratio under different types of unit price functions with different bmax/bmin
Figure 7 shows that the acceptance ratio under exponential unit price function is higher than
that under other types of functions, this is the reason why the exponential unit price function
(Eq.(6)) is used as the iteration rule in Line 16 of Algorithm 1. Then we report the variation of the
hourly average social welfare in Figure 8. We find that if bmax/bmin = 5, the value of social welfare
is higher than its counterparts under all three types of unit price functions. Moreover, the social
welfare in terms of time slot exhibits a similar pattern under three types of unit price functions.
To observe the influence of mobility resources capacity C and of the travel mode speeds onto
social welfare we set the value of bmax/bmin to 5 and conduct sensitivity analysis on these parameters
reported in Figure 9. Figure 9a shows that social welfare grows with the increase of capacity over
all time slots, and that the social welfare remains unchanged beyond a capacity of 500. then apply
29
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2000
1000
Operating hours during one day
So
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
 (
$
)
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 5
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 10
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 15
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 20
(a) Linear unit price function
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2000
1000
Operating hours during one day
So
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
 (
$
)
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 5
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 10
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 15
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 20
(b) Quadratic unit price function
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2000
1000
Operating hours during one day
So
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
 (
$
) 𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 10
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 15
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 20
𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒏
= 5
(c) Exponential unit price function
Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis on different types of pricing functions under different bmax/bmin
a speed factor (−75%, −50%,−25%,1,+25%,+50%) on the speed of each travel mode vm and report
the results of social welfare. Figure 9b shows that the speed change ratio has very limited influence
on social welfare over all time slots, and thus illustrate the reliability of the proposed MaaS system.
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Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis on capacity (C) and speed change ratio (∆v)
7.2.2. Comparison of the PAYG and PAAP mechanisms
In this subsection, we compare the daily social welfare achieved using both the PAYG and
PAAP mechanisms, denoted SPAY G and WPAAP , respectively. The travel demand at time slot t
in the PAYG mechanism (λt) and in the PAAP mechanism (κt) are given in Table 6 and Table 7,
respectively. Since each time slot represents one day in the PAAP mechanism and represents one
minute in the PAYG mechanism, travel demand at time slot t in PAAP mechanism (κt) is set as the
summation of λt over 1200 time slots on workdays, (κt =
∑1200
t=1 λt), and is set as κt = h
∑1200
t=1 λt
on weekends, where h is randomly set within [40%,80%]. The time period (Li) is set as 1, 5, 6
and 7 in different weeks, then the bidding language sets in PAAP mechanism are obtained based
on that in the PAYG mechanism by multiplying the parameters (Tij , bij ,Φi,Γi,Qi) with Li. Let
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WPAY G denote the social welfare of one time slot (min) in the PAYG mechanism. If Li = 1,
WPAAP corresponds to the summation of WPAY G over 1200 time slots, SPAY G =
∑1200
t=1 WPAY G.
Table 7: Parameters setting in the online PAAP mechanism
Day Week 1 Week 2 Week 4 Week 3 (6,7,8)weekday weekend weekday weekend weekday weekend weekday weekend
t [1 · · · , 5] [6,7] [8, · · · , 12] [13,14] [22, · · · , 26] [27,28] [15, · · · , 19] [20,21]
Li 1 1 7 7 6 6 5 5
To compare both PAYG and PAAP mechanisms, we execute Algorithms 1 and 2, and report
results in Figures 10 and 11. Figure 10a shows that the social welfare during morning peak hours
(time slot 120−240) and evening peak hours (time slot 720−840) is considerably higher than that
in off-peak hours using the PAYG mechanism.
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Figure 10: Social welfare (WPAYG), unit price (pt) and available mobility resources (At) in the PAYG mechanism
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Figure 11: Social welfare (WPAAP ), unit price (pt) and available mobility resources (At) in the PAAP mechanism
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Comparing the social welfare achieved over time period Li using the PAYG mechanism, Li ·
SPAY G, with that achieved using the PAAP mechanism, WPAAP (e.g., comparing SPAY G($183398)
with WPAAP in week 1 (Li = 1) and 7SPAY G ($1283789) with WPAAP in week 2 (Li = 7)), we find
that the social welfare of the PAAP mechanism is higher than that using the PAYG mechanism
(Figure 11a). Moreover, Figure 10b and Figure 11b show that the unit price at time slot t exhibits
an opposite pattern against the available resources at time slot t due to the proposed time-varying
pricing scheme, and the range of unit price (pt) in the PAAP mechanism ($1∼$9) is lower than the
unit price (pt) in the PAYG mechanism ($2∼$12).
7.2.3. Competitive ratio analysis
We analyse the competitive ratio (Θ) given in Theorem 2/Theorem 4 by comparing with the
social welfare ratio (R) defined as the ratio of social welfare obtained by Algorithm 1/Algorithm
2 to the corresponding offline formulation (Model 2/Model 4).
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Figure 12: Competitive ratio (Θ), the number of bids (|J |) and the number of time slots (Nt) in the PAYG mechanism
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Figure 13: Social welfare ratio (R), the number of bids (|J |) and the number of time slots (Nt) in PAYG mechanism
In the PAYG mechanism, the number of bids (|J |) is assumed to be comprised between 1 ∼ 10,
and the travel demand at each time slot is given in Table 7. Figure 12a shows the relationship
among the value of the competitive ratio (Θ), the number of bids (|J |) and the number of time
slots (Nt). Figure 12b shows that if j = 1, the value of Θ is within 0.54511 ∼ 0.62145; if j = 2,
the value of Θ is within 0.60109 ∼ 0.63128; whereas if j = 3, 4, · · · , 10, the value of Θ is within
32
0.61565 ∼ 0.63128. Figure 12c shows that competitive ratio (Θ) is independent on the number of
time slots (Nt).
Figure 13a shows the relationship among social welfare ratio (R), the number of bids (|J |)
and the number of time slots (Nt) in the PAYG mechanism. Figure 13b shows that if j = 1, the
value of R is within 0.74451 ∼ 0.84882, if j = 2, the value of R is within 0.74125 ∼ 0.86158,
whereas if j = 3, 4, · · · , 10, the value of R is within 0.78451 ∼ 0.90882. Figure 13c shows that
the value of social welfare ratio (R) is independent on the number of time slots (Nt). Figure 12
and Figure 13 show that the competitive ratio (Θ) given in Theorem 2 can always provide a lower
bound for the social welfare ratio (R) under different size of input time sequence, which validates
the derived competitive ratio (Θ) in the PAYG mechanism. The gap between R and Θ is within
0.19614 ∼ 0.27754. In the PAAP mechanism, Figure 14a shows the relationship of R, |J | and Nt.
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Figure 14: Competitive ratio (Θ), the number of bids (|J |) and the number of time slots (Nt) in PAAP mechanism
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Figure 15: Social welfare ratio (R), the number of bids (|J |) and the number of time slots (Nt) in PAAP mechanism
Figure 14b shows that if j = 1, the value of Θ is within 0.632117 ∼ 0.632120; if j = 2, 3, · · · , 10,
the value of Θ is within 0.632116 ∼ 0.632120. Figure 14b and Figure 14c show that the value
of Θ is independent on |J | and Nt. Figure 15b shows that if j = 1, the value of R is within
0.71451 ∼ 0.80123; if j = 2, the value of R is within 0.73412 ∼ 0.80123; whereas if j = 3, 4, · · · , 10,
the value of R is within 0.78321 ∼ 0.82742. Figure 15c shows that the value of R is independent
on Nt. Figure 14 and Figure 15 verify the derived competitive ratio (Θ) given in Theorem 4. The
gap between R and Θ is within 0.082394 ∼ 0.1953.
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7.2.4. Impact of booking flexibility
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of booking flexibility by comparing two types of
rolling horizon configurations with same time step and different time horizon lengths in the context
of the PAYG mechanism: RHA (∆t = 1, T = 1) and RHA (∆t = 1, T = 240). The input data is
the same for both configurations. Considering the booking feasibility in RHA (∆t = 1, T = 240),
we simulate travelers’ booking behavior and set each traveler’s requested departure time (Oi) as a
random number satisfying a triangular distribution within [t,t+ 240].
Figure 16a shows the relationship among social welfare (W ), the number of bids (|J |) and time
slot (t) under RHA (∆t = 1, T = 1) and |J | has little influence on W . Figure 16b and Figure 16c
are projection plots of t−|J |−W figure under RHA (∆t = 1, T = 1) and RHA (∆t = 1, T = 240),
respectively. Compared with Figure 16b, Figure 16c show that the social welfare in non-peak hours
starts to increase 240 time slots beforehand RHA (∆t = 1, T = 240). Since the total travel demand
remains unchanged, the social welfare increases during off-peak hours and decreases during peak
hours. Namely, Setting a longer time horizon lengths (T ) can improve travelers’ booking flexibility
and balance the social welfare across peak hours and off-peak hours.
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Figure 16: RHA (∆t=1,T =1 ) and RHA (∆t=1,T =240)
7.2.5. Comparison of rolling horizon algorithm configurations
In this section, we conduct 100 Monte Carlo simulations to compare the mean value of com-
putation time and social welfare obtained by the proposed online algorithms, online formulations
and offline formulations under four types of rolling horizon configurations introduced in Section 6.
The results for the PAYG mechanism are reported in Figure 17 and based on the following four
configurations:
1) Solve online algorithm (Algorithm 1) with Python based on RHA (∆t = 1,T = 240);
2) Solve online MILP (Model 1) with CPLEX based on RHA (∆t = 1,T = 240);
3) Solve offline MILP (Model 2) with CPLEX based on RHA (∆t = 10, T = 240);
4) Solve offline MILP (Model 2) with CPLEX based on SHA (∆t = 240, T = 240).
Figure 17a and Figure 17b show that the computation time of online and offline algorithms
increase with the increasing number of time slots (Nt). The computational runtime of the offline
algorithm increases exponentially with the number of time slots.
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Figure 17: Comparing the computation time and social welfare obtained by different configures in PAYG mechanism
Analogously, the results for the PAAP mechanism are reported in Figure 18 based on the fol-
lowing four configurations:
1) Solve online algorithm (Algorithm 2) with Python based on RHA (∆t = 1, T = 100);
2) Solve online MILP (Model 3) with CPLEX based on RHA (∆t = 1, T = 100);
3) Solve offline MILP (Model 4) with CPLEX based on RHA (∆t = 10, T = 100);
4) Solve offline MILP (Model 4) with CPLEX based on SHA (∆t = 100, T = 100).
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Figure 18: Comparing the computation time and social welfare obtained by different configures in PAAP mechanism
Figure 17a and Figure 18a show that the offline configuration runs in exponential time and
takes significantly more time than online configurations. Figure 17c and Figure 18c show that
the social welfare obtained by the offline configurations is considerably larger than that obtained
by the online configurations, among which ‘RHA: offline MILP’ can obtain the maximum social
welfare. We observe that the social welfare obtained by Algorithm 1 (resp. Algorithm 2) is only
marginally lower than that obtained by the online MILP Model 1 (resp. Model 3) when solved
to optimality. In turn, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are faster compared to exact optimization
methods. Overall, the rolling horizon configuration (∆t = 10, T = 240) is shown to reduce the gap
in social welfare observed between the online and offline algorithms, while retaining substantial
computational efficiency.
We conducted a sensitivity analysis on the time step (∆t) of the RHA using the PAYG mech-
anism (the results in reported in Figure D.19 in the Appendix). Our findings show that when
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∆t under SHA increases from 10∼200, in terms of social welfare we have ‘SHA: offline MILP’ >
‘RHA: offline MILP’ > ‘RHA: online MILP’ > ‘RHA: online algorithm’, which is consistent with
the results shown in Figure 17.
8. Conclusion and remarks
We first summarize the main contributions of this work before outlining the differences between
the proposed MaaS paradigm and traditional approaches and discussing future research directions.
8.1. Conclusion
This paper introduces an innovative MaaS paradigm under two types of payment options (mech-
anisms): Pay-as-You-Go and Pay-as-a-Package. Two MaaS online mechanisms, which can effec-
tively and efficiently match mobility resources with travelers’ requirements and WTP, are proposed
based on a dynamic auction setting in which travelers have the possibility to place multiple bids
for MaaS bundles. The PAYG online mechanism is formulated as a mixed-integer linear program
whereas the PAAP online mechanism is formulated as a linear program. Both formulations are
shown to be incentive-compatible. We propose polynomial-time, online primal-dual algorithms for
both PAYG and PAAP mechanisms and derive the competitive ratio of these online algorithms.
Specifically, we show that the PAYG online algorithm (Algorithm 1) has a competitive ratio of
(1− 1α)(1−Rmax) (Theorem 2), and that the PAAP online algorithm (Algorithm 2) has a compet-
itive ratio of (1− 1β ) (Theorem 4). Further, if QiAt → 0, the competitive ratio of Algorithm 1 tends
to that of Algorithm 2.
The proposed MaaS online mechanisms are tested through extensive numerical experiments
which highlight the performance of the proposed online primal-dual algorithms, as well as the
benefits which can be obtained through the proposed rolling horizon algorithm framework. The
results indicate that MaaS online mechanisms are feasible with regard to the parameters (e.g., the
number of bids, the ratio of the maximum unit biding price to the minimum unit bidding price,
travel demand in a time slot, speed change ratio, and capacity) and different types of unit price
functions. Comparing the PAYG and the PAAP mechanisms, we find that the PAAP mechanism
can improve social welfare and reduce the daily unit price of mobility resources. However, as noted
by Ho et al. (2018), in the PAAP mechanism, travelers have to make a large payment compared
to the PAYG mechanism, which may negatively affect the practicality of this mechanism. The
competitive ratio (Θ) of Algorithm 1 (resp. Algorithm 2) can provide a lower bound for the social
welfare ratio (R) in the PAYG (resp. PAAP) mechanism. Further, we find that rolling horizon
configurations with larger time horizons can improve users’ booking flexibility. We also observe
that the rolling horizon configuration (∆t = 10, T = 240) provides an efficient compromise between
solution quality and computational scalability.
8.2. Remarks and future research
The global economic transition and state-of-the-art technologies are driving the transforma-
tion of the transport sector from an infrastructure/manufacturing focused industry to a ser-
vice/experience focused industry (Hong, 2018). In line with the transition from a focus on ‘prod-
ucts’ to ‘service’ to ‘experience’, we proposed an innovative MaaS paradigm emphasizing the nature
of service nature and user experience. In this paradigm, travelers can bid for mobility resources in
a continuous fashion and expect multi-modal mobility services tailored to their willingness to pay
and travel requirements.
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The proposed MaaS paradigm is travel mode-agnostic and delivers transport accessibility by
allocating continuous quantities of mobility resources to travelers based on their preferences, in
contrast to more conventional discrete mode choice models. In this MaaS paradigm, travel distance
is represented as a weighted combination of travel modes and travel speed, thus allowing travelers
to purchase any quantity of mobility resources based on his or her preferences. The proposed MaaS
online mechanisms are incentive-compatible, in which each traveler is allocated mobility services
that maximize his or her utility, thus providing a sustainable transportation model. Further, the
multi-bid online auction setting offers travelers the possibility to consider multiple MaaS bundles.
Moreover, the proposed MaaS online mechanisms can guarantee that travelers with a higher WTP
can preferentially obtain a mobility service with higher quality.
Sochor et al. (2018) proposed a four-level taxonomy to divide different MaaS schemes, current
MaaS schemes such as UbiGo have not reached Level 3 (integration of the service offer). In
comparison, the proposed MaaS paradigm aims to reach the highest level (integration of societal
goals). Although the proposed paradigm may provide several advantages as discussed above,
autonomous transport systems are the premise for this MaaS paradigm (Chen et al., 2020). Many
more practical issues have to be addressed before such a MaaS paradigm can be implemented,
which are discussed as follows.
At the micro level, travelers’ habits and attitudes are recognised as essential factors. In the
proposed MaaS paradigm, travelers need to quantify the abstract characters (e.g., inconvenience
tolerance and delay budget) and report them to MaaS operator, which might be difficult for non-
sensitive travelers or mode-specific travelers. Karlsson et al. (2020) showed that it is difficult to
change people’s travel behaviour due to the established habits and the individual’s perceived ‘action
space’; thus we have to consider travelers’ adoption: are travelers willing to change their habits and
substitute private cars with mobility service? Can travelers adopt the new way of being served?
At the micro level, Merkert et al. (2020) identified the importance of system integration and
the elimination of the influence of boundary effects on different modes in a system, and indicated
that the public and private combined operation of MaaS systems may increase the pressure upon
TSPs to provide a multi-modal and seamless service. Thus the collaboration and responsibilities
of different stakeholders in the MaaS ecosystem need to be considered: will different stakeholders
form coalitions? How to improve the benefits of multiple stakeholders?
This paper has taken a first step towards designing an experience-relevant MaaS paradigm
based on a continuous representation of mobility service. However, market dynamics and other
complex factors in MaaS systems are not accounted for in the proposed approach motivating
future research in this direction. In particular, two-sided economic deregulated MaaS markets,
or hierarchical configurations such as Stackelberg competition between TSPs and travelers may
provide more realistic configurations for the development of emerging MaaS ecosystems.
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Appendix A. Mathematical Notation
Notation Specification
Variables
lmij Continuous variable denoting the the travel time served by mode m for Traveler i’s bid j
pt Continuous variable denoting the unit price at time slot t in offline formulation
ptij Continuous variable denoting the actual payment of Traveler i’s bid j at time slot t
q(t) Dual variable of the online and offline compact-LP interpreted as the unit price at time slot t
ri,s Continuous variable denoting the fraction allocated to Traveler i’s bundle plan s
rti,s Continuous variable denoting the fraction allocated to Traveler i’s bundle plan s at time slot t
xij
Binary variable denoting whether Traveler i’s bid j is accepted in the PAYG mechanism
Continuous variable denoting the fraction of the allocated to Traveler i’s bid j in the PAAP mechanism
xtij
Binary variable denoting whether Traveler i’s bid j is accepted at time slot t in the PAYG mechanism
Continuous variable denoting the fraction allocated to Traveler i’s bid j at time slot t in the PAAP mechanism
χi,s Binary variable denoting whether bundle plan s is allocated to Traveler i
χti,s Binary variable denoting whether bundle plan s is allocated to Traveler i at time slot t
Parameters
At The weighted quantity of available mobility resources at time slot t
Bi
Traveler i’s bidding language in the PAYG mechanism: Bi = {Di, Oi,Φi,Γi, {Tij , bij : j ∈ Ji}}
Traveler i’s bidding language in PAAP mechanism: Bi = {Di,Φi, Oi,Φi,Γi, Li, {Tij , bij : j ∈ Ji}}
bij Bidding price of Traveler i’s bid j
bi,s Bidding price of Traveler i’s bundle plan s
bmax The maximum unit bidding price at each time slot, bmax = maxi∈I(t),j∈Ji
{
bij
Qij
}
bmin The minimum unit bidding price at each time slot, bmin = mini∈I(t),j∈Ji
{
bij
Qij
}
C Capacity of the mobility resources in each time slot: C =
∑
m∈M vm ·Nmvmhm
Di Traveler i’s shortest travelling distance arranged by MaaS operator based on ζi
Li Traveler i’s requested time period for the mobility package in the PAAP mechanism
Li The sum of travel time served by different modes in travel i’s bundle plan in the PAYG mechanism
Oi Traveler i’s requested departure time in PAYG mechanism and start date in the PAAP mechanism
pij The actual payment of Traveler i’s bid j, which is a constant in each time slot
Qij Weighted quantity: distance weighted by Traveler i’s requested speed for bid j: Qij = Di DiTij
Qi,s Weighted quantity: distance weighted by Traveler i’s requested speed for bundle plan s
Qi The maximum weighted quantity of resources requested by Traveler i: Qi = maxs∈Si {Qi,s} , ∀i ∈ I(t)
Qi The minimum weighted quantity of resources requested by Traveler i: Qi = mins∈Si {Qi,s} ,∀i ∈ I(t)
Rt The maximum ratio of Qi to At at time slot t: Rt = maxi∈I(t)
{
Qi
At
}
R The ratio of social welfare obtained through online algorithm to the offline formulation
Tij The requested travel time of Traveler i’s bid j
T Time horizon lengths in the rolling horizon framework
t
Time slot representing a small time interval such as one minute in the PAYG mechanism
Time slot representing one day in the PAAP mechanism
vm Average speed of transportation mode m
Γi The maximum inconvenience degrees that Traveler i can tolerate during a service
∆t time step representing the frequency of rolling forward in the rolling horizon framework
δm Inconvenience degrees brought by being served with mode-m vehicle per time slot
ζi Traveler i’s origin and destination information, which is converted into Di by MaaS operator
Θ Competitive ratio
Φi Traveler i’s delay budget: maximum delay that Traveler i can accept during a service
ϕt The minimum ratio of Qi to At at time slot t: ϕt = mini∈I(t)
{Qi
At
}
Sets
I Set of travelers (I(1), I(2) . . . , I(t)) requesting for a mobility service overall time slots.
I(t) Set of travelers (1, 2 . . . , I) requesting for a mobility service at time slot t.
I(n) Set of travelers in the n-th rolling process in the rolling horizon framework.
Ji Set of bids submitted by traveler i
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M Set of transportation modes M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
U(n) Set of travelers in the n-th rolling process, who request a service in the previous time horizon.
Si Set of Traveler i’s bundle plans in online formulation.
Sti Set of Traveler i’s bundle plans in offline formulation.
Ω Set of time slots in the PAYG mechanism.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemmas and Theorem for the PAAP mechanism
Appendix B.1. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We now show that Model 3 can be reformulated as compact packaging reformulation. Let
di,s denote the total distance in the bundle plan s, di,s =
∑
m∈M vmlmij , ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, s ∈ Sij .
According to Traveler i’s distance requirement in constraint (8b) of Model 3, we obtain Eq.(B.1):∑
s∈Si
di,s =
∑
j∈Ji
∑
s∈Sij
di,s =
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈Ji
vml
m
ij =
∑
j∈Ji
Dixij , ∀i ∈ I(t). (B.1)
Assume that package plan s is arranged for Traveler i’s bid j, let bi,s and Qi,s denote Traveler
i’s bidding price and weighted quantity of mobility resources in the package plan s, then we have
bi,s = bij , Qi,s = Qij , ∀i ∈ I(t), j ∈ Ji, s ∈ Sij .
Summing i ∈ I(t) over both sides of ∑s∈Si di,s = ∑j∈Ji Dixij yields:∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
di,s =
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
j∈Ji
Dixij . (B.2)
Based on Eq.(B.2), the objective function of Model 3, ∑i∈I(t)∑j∈Ji bi,sxij , can be rewritten as
Eq.(B.3c). Then constraint (8f) in Model 3 can be rewritten as: ∑s∈Si Qi,s ≤ At. Thus Model 3
can be reformulated as a compact LP (B.3) with packaging structure given in 6.
max
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
bi,s
Di
di,s, (B.3a)
subject to∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qi,s ≤ At, (B.3b)
∑
s∈Si
di,s
Di
≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I(t), (B.3c)
di,s ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I(t), s ∈ Si, (B.3d)
where constraint (B.3b) and (B.3c) corresponds to constraint (8f) and (8g). If we replace di,s with
Diri,s, then compact-LP (B.3) can be reformulated as a compact-LP (36) given in Lemma 6.
Appendix B.2. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. The proof follows from that of Lemma 2.
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Appendix B.3. Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. In each iteration of a time loop, ∆D(i, s) can be written as Eq.(B.4), in which ui and ∆q(t)
is obtained from Line 15 and Line 16 in Algorithm 2.
∆D(i, s) = At∆q(t) + ui = At
[
q(t)Qi
At
+ bi,sri,s(βt − 1)At −
(1− ri,s)bi,s
At
]
+ ui,
=
(
1 + 1
βt − 1
)
bi,sri,s.
(B.4)
In each iteration of a time loop, the change in the objective value of primal problem is:
∆P(i, s) =
∑
s′∈Si
bi,s′ri,s′ −
∑
s′∈Si\{s}
bi,s′ri,s′ = bi,sri,s. (B.5)
According to Eq.(B.4) and Eq.(B.5), we have Eq.(B.6):(
1 + 1
βt − 1
)
∆P(i, s) = ∆D(i, s). (B.6)
Appendix B.4. Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. We first prove that Algorithm 2 yields dual feasible solutions. If q(t) ≥ bi,sQi , then the
dual constraint always holds. If q(t) ≤ bi,sQi , the dual variable q(t) will be increased until the
dual constraint are satisfied. else if q(t) ≤ bi,sQi , the dual variables will be increased until the
dual constraint are satisfied. Since ui(t) = bi,s − Qiq(t) (Line 15), the subsequent increase of
q(t) can always guarantee the feasible of solutions. We next show that Algorithm 2 yields primal
feasible solutions. The iteration rule of q(t) (Line 16) ensures that q(t) is bounded by the sum of a
geometric sequence with the common ratio (1 + QiAt ). Consider a geometric sequence produced by
the iterations of q(t) for Traveler m: the first item is at most bm,s(βt−1)At , in which the value of bm,s
is fixed in each iteration (Lines 12-16), and the common ratio is 1 + QmAt . Based on the formula of
the sum of geometric sequence, we obtain Eq.(B.7), where the number of iterations of Algorithm 2
in each time loop is smaller than ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si ri,s. Then Eq.(B.7) can be rewritten as Eq.(B.8).
q(t) ≤ bm,sQm ·
1
βt − 1 ·
[(
1 + Qm
At
)∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
ri,s
− 1
]
, (B.7)
≤ bm,sQm ·
1
βt − 1 ·
(1 + QmAt
) At
Qm ·
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qmri,s
At − 1
 , (B.8)
Since ϕt = mini∈I(t)
{Qi
At
}
. Since 0 ≤ DmAt ≤ QiAt ≤ 1, Eq.(B.8) can be rewritten as Eq.(B.9):
q(t) ≤ bm,sQm ·
1
βt − 1 ·
(1 + QmAt
) At
Dm
·
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qiri,s
At − 1
 . (B.9)
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Since 0 ≤ ϕt ≤ QiAt ≤ 1, we have
ln(1+Qi
At
)
Qi
At
≤ ln(1+ϕt)ϕt , namely, (1 + QiAt )Rmin ≤ (1 +ϕt)
Qi
At , yields:
1 + Qi
At
≤ (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt
·Qi
At . (B.10)
Since βt = (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt ,Qi = mins∈Si {Qi,s}, Eq.(B.9) is written as Eq.(B.11) based on Eq.(B.10):
q(t) ≤ bm,s
Dm
· 1
βt − 1 ·
β
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qi,sri,s
At
t − 1
 . (B.11)
According to Eq.(B.11), if ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qi,sri,s ≤ At, then q(t) ≤ bm,sDm ; Since Algorithm 2 only
updates the primal solutions if q(t) ≤ bm,sDm (Line 13), the primal optimal solutions will be updated
when ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qi,sri,s ≤ At.
Appendix B.5. Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. The proof follows from that of Lemma 6.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let k be the critical index determined at Line 7 of Algorithm 1). Let q(t)end and q(t)start
denote the value of q(t) before and after each iteration in the loop of i = k in Algorithm 1,
respectively. Substituting q(t)end and q(t)start into Line 16 of Algorithm 1, yields Eq.(C.1).
q(t)end ≤ qstart(1 + Qk
At
) + bk,s(βt − 1)At . (C.1)
According to Eq.(B.9), we have Eq.(C.2):
q(t)start ≤ bk,sQk ·
1
βt − 1 ·
β
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiri,s
At
t − 1
 . (C.2)
According to Eq.(C.1) and Eq.(C.2), we obtain Eq.(C.3):
q(t)end ≤ bk,sQk ·
1
βt − 1 ·
β
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiri,s
At
t ·
(
1 + Qk
At
)
− 1
 . (C.3)
According to Eq.(B.10), we have 1 + QkAt ≤ (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt
·Qk
At , Eq.(C.3) can be rewritten as Eq.(C.4).
q(t)end ≤ bk,sQk ·
1
βt − 1 ·
β
∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si
Qiri,s
At
t · (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt
·Qk
At − 1
 . (C.4)
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Since βt = (1 + ϕt)
1
ϕt , Eq.(C.4) can be written as Eq.(C.5):
q(t)end ≤ bk,sQk ·
1
βt − 1 ·
β
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qiri,s
At
t − 1
 . (C.5)
According to Eq.(C.5), the primal variable ri,s will be updated if
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si Qiri,s ≤ At,
elseif ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qiri,s > At , MaaS operator will stop allocating mobility resources at time
slot t, and there k is allocated with the remaining resources at time slot t, rk,s(t) = At −∑
i∈I(t)\{k}
∑
s∈Si Qiri,s(t). Since all of the mobility resources at time slot t will be used up due
to the fractional allocation, namely, ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si Qiri,s = At, the total social welfare obtained by
Algorithm 2 extracted from time slot t is at least ∑i∈I(t)∑s∈Si bi,sχi,s
∑
i∈I(t)
∑
s∈Si
Qiri,s
At
. Let P(t)
and D(t) denote the objective value of primal problem (Eq.(36)) and its dual problem obtained by
Algorithm 2 in time t loop, respectively. Based on Lemma 8, we have P(t) =
(
1− 1βt
)
D(t).
Given the input time sequence τ = [1, 2, · · · , t − 1, t], let P(τ ) and D(τ ) denote the objective
value of the primal problem (Eq.(44)) and its dual problem obtained by Algorithm 1. Let WAlg2(τ )
denote the social welfare obtained by Algorithm 2, Z∗(τ ) denote the optimal value of the offline
primal problem Eq.(44),Since β = mint∈τ βt, Eq.(29) implies P(τ ) ≥
(
1− 1β
)
D(τ ). Moreover, we
have WAlg2(τ ) ≥
(
1− 1β
)
D(τ ). According to the weak duality, we have D(τ ) ≥ Z∗(τ ), yields:
WAlg2(τ ) ≥
(
1− 1
β
)
Z∗(τ ). (C.6)
Hence the competitive ratio of Algorithm 2 is Θ = 1− 1β .
Appendix D. Sensitivity analysis on the time step
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Figure D.19: Sensitivity analysis on the time step (∆t) in terms of social welfare in the PAYG mechanism.
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